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ABSTRACT
With the emergence of cloud computing, outsourcing data services to cloud servers is becoming
more and more prevalent. Along with this arise also security and privacy concerns. Particularly, it
is an important concern to the user that the service provider itself may be malicious and breach the
secrecy and privacy of users. Although encrypting data content has been a common practice, it does
not relieve the concerns, because users data access pattern is not preserved and researchers have found
that a wide range of private information could be conveniently revealed by observing the access pattern.
It is, therefore, critical to investigate the problem of protecting users access pattern privacy in untrusted
storage.
Existing solutions that provide strict protection to the privacy of access pattern incur very high
overhead, such as high bandwidth cost, long round-trip delay and/or large user side storage. The high
overhead is a major barrier that hampers the adoption of these solutions in practice. Although strict
protection of access pattern privacy is attractive, less strict protection, such as protecting the privacy of
long-term access pattern, is also very useful in practice. Based on these considerations, we investigate
the problem of protecting the long-term access pattern privacy in un-trusted storage and propose two
light-weight schemes to preserve the privacy of long-term access pattern. We conduct rigorous proofs
and extensive evaluations to demonstrate that the proposed schemes can hide the data access pattern in
the long run, and the number of accesses required to preserve the access pattern privacy is reasonable
in many situations.
With outsourced data storage, keyword based query is a critical and primitive function for the users
to access the data of their interest. Similar to access pattern, exposure of query pattern also leads to
the leakage of sensitive information about the queried keyword and data. We show that without proper
protection of both the query trapdoor and the access pattern, the query pattern may be exposed readily.
xii
Based on the framework of our access pattern privacy protection schemes, we propose a novel defense
solution that protects the query privacy in a light-weight manner.
One important benefit offered by cloud storage is its convenience for data sharing among multiple
users. But when not all users are trusted, it is important to hold malicious users accountable for their
misconduct. Due to conflicting goals of user accountability and access pattern privacy preservation,
existing user accountability solutions cannot be readily integrated with ORAM constructions. As the
last part of this dissertation, we investigate the problem of introducing support of user accountability
into hash-based ORAM. We propose a scheme that can detect misconduct by malicious users and iden-
tify the attackers, while not interfering with the access pattern preservation mechanisms inherent from
the underlying ORAM. Security and overhead analysis shows that the proposed scheme has achieved
the design goals of providing accountability support to ORAM and preservation of data access pattern
privacy, at the cost of slightly increased storage, communication, and computational overheads.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Data and User Privacy in Un-trusted Storage
Data outsourcing is a popular solution adopted by users to enable ubiquitous access to their data,
as well as to maintain high availability of the data. With the emergence of cloud computing [1, 2],
cloud-based data service, such as Amazon Web Service and Google Cloud Service, is becoming more
and more prevalent. Cloud computing enables users to enjoy flexible, on-demand and high-quality
services, without the need to invest on expensive infrastructure, platform or maintenance. As a result,
more and more user data (e.g., emails, multimedia, finance records, etc., as shown in Fig. 1.1) has been
centralized into the cloud.
 
 
Secrecy
Identity
Query
Access pattern
Integrity
Confidentiality
Authenticity
User
Privacy
Figure 1.1: An example of cloud services and user’s security concerns.
Along with the increasing popularity of outsourcing data services to remote cloud servers, arise
also security and privacy concerns. Though the cloud providers are striving to provide more secure and
reliable cloud services, it is still an important concern to the user that the service provider itself may
be malicious and breach the user’s secrecy and privacy. For example, as one of the most popular cloud
service providers, Google has long been criticized for tapping into its users’ data [3–6].
2Rising to the challenges, researchers have proposed many schemes [7–13] to protect the secrecy
of the user data, by protecting the the data confidentiality and integrity and/or ensuring the user’s
authenticity (as shown in Fig. 1.1). Generally, these solutions prevent/detect potential secrecy breakage
to the user data by preventing/detecting unauthorized access to the content of the user data. However,
protection of the data content alone is not enough, because a wide range of private information could be
conveniently revealed by the contextual information that is associated with the user’s access to the data,
such as the access pattern [14, 15]. When accessing data stored on the remote server, a user inevitably
reveals access pattern. Leakage of the access pattern may expose important information about the user
and data and enable a large variety of potential privacy attacks. For example, in Fig. 1.1, an iCloud user
may store his/her connections contact information on the remote server. Then based on the different
access frequency to each connections contact information, the server may infer the social relation (e.g.,
family, close friend, etc.) between a connection and the user in real life. As another example, some of
the users data may be requested with very high frequency. These data are often important to the user.
If a malicious server knows which files are frequently accessed, it may launch intensive attacks on the
data, attempting to find out the content or contextual information of the data.
In this dissertation, we investigate the problem of protecting user’s access pattern privacy in un-
trusted storage. In literature, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) and private information retrieval (PIR) are two
major security-provable techniques that provide provable-secure protections to access pattern privacy.
More specifically, PIR [16–24] protocols are proposed to preserve access pattern in accessing read-
only data from remote storage. There are two flavors of PIR protocols: information-theoretic PIR
(iPIR) [16, 18, 20, 21, 24], which assumes multiple non-colluding servers each holding one replica of
the shared data, and computational PIR (cPIR) [17, 19, 23], which typically assumes a single server.
Compared to ORAM, PIR has the following limitations: (i) PIR only applies to the context where data
items are read-only, while ORAM applies even if data items are modifiable. (ii) cPIR generally incurs
higher overheads than ORAM and iPIR also causes higher overheads than ORAM under most practical
settings, where the number of non-colluding servers is small and/or the scale of the data base is very
large. So in this dissertation, we refer to ORAM as the state-of-the-art technique in protecting access
pattern privacy. In the following, we will briefly review the evolution of the ORAM technique.
31.2 Evolution of Oblivious RAM
1.2.1 Proposal of ORAM
The notion of ORAM was introduced by O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky [25–27] in the context
of software protection. It was proposed as a technique to prevent “software piracy”. In its problem
settings, the execution of software is considered as a physically shielded CPU accessing an encrypted
program in memory (RAM). The CPU contains a small ROM that stores the corresponding decryption
key. It was shown that by merely encrypting the program is not sufficient to prevent the software from
being pirated because the addresses of the memory cells accessed during the execution are exposed.
This may allow an observer to obtain essential information about the program (e.g. its loop structure),
and may further allow him to reconstruct it. As a result, it is necessary to protect the “access pattern”,
i.e., the pattern of how the memory cells are accessed. ORAM was therefore proposed as a solution to
this problem. Though not widely adopted by software companies, the ORAM technique now becomes
useful in protecting data access pattern privacy in the era of cloud computing, which shares similar
security settings as software protection when ORAM was proposed. Specifically, in cloud computing,
users’ data are outsourced to the cloud in encrypted format and users access their data with their own
client devices. Similar to software protection, simple encryption of the user data is not enough to
protect the user privacy because the access pattern to the data may expose sensitive information about
the data. However, the original ORAM must be revised to fit the requirements of cloud computing,
which are quite different from software protection. For simplicity, the following discussions are all
based on the context of cloud computing.
1.2.2 Hash-based Hierarchical ORAM
In [25], the ORAM technique was firstly investigated and two solutions were proposed, namely,
a “square-root” solution and a “recursive square-root” solution. In the “square-root” solution, the
computation, communication and server storage overhead all increase by a factor of O(
p
n), while
in the recursive solution the overhead increase by O(2
p
logn log logn), where n is the number of data
blocks that are stored on the cloud server. In [26], a different and more efficient “hierarchical” ORAM
4scheme was proposed. In the hierarchical ORAM, it employs a sequence of buffers whose size grow
at a geometric rate. An the end of each user access, the accessed data blocks are put back to the
smallest buffer, which will be reshuffled to the larger one as it fills up. Similarly, all buffers will be
reshuffled as the user keeps accessing the data. The proposed ORAM employs a technique known as
oblivious sorting to perform the reshuffle, which in essence sorts all the data items according to their
new locations obliviously. In terms of overhead, the “hierarchical” ORAM requires constant client side
storage and O(n log n) server side storage. Its communication and computational overhead is either
O(log4 n) with a small hidden constant, orO(log3 n) with a large hidden constant. A slightly different,
but simpler ORAM scheme was proposed in [27] with the same asymptotic overhead.
Following the framework proposed by O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky, there are many works that
aim to reduce the storage, communication and computational overhead of the hierarchical ORAM.
Based on the way that hash-based ORAM is constructed, there are basically two sorts of effort to
reduce the overhead: (i) by reducing the overhead that comes with regular query, and (ii) by reducing
the overhead that is caused by the oblivious sorting during shuffling.
1.2.2.1 Reducing the Overhead of Regular Queries
In the original ORAM construction [27], the client maps data items into bins using random hash
functions and the number of items mapped into each bin must be hidden from the server. During a
query, a bin is retrieved at each layer of the hierarchy. To avoid bin overflowing (with high probability),
the original ORAM scheme sets each bin to have sufficient room forO(log n) items, and stores in a bin
fake items if less than this number of items are mapped to it. As a result, the overall storage overhead
and communication/computational overhead for queries has been increased by a factor of log n.
To reduce the overhead that comes with regular queries, [28] proposes to use additional Bloom
filters [29] to indicate whether the requested data item locates in a certain layer. In [28], by using
Bloom filters, each bin can contain only one data item. During a query, before attempting to query for
the requested data item at a certain layer, a per-layer Bloom filter is queried first. The bits of the Bloom
filter indicate whether the requested data item exists in the current layer. The bits of the Bloom filter are
encrypted to hide the result of the query. Consequently, this approach reduces both the overall storage
5and communication/computational overhead by a factor of log n compared with the original ORAM.
However, [14] shows that without a careful choice of Bloom filter parameters, the construction of [28]
may leak information to the server via Bloom filters’ false positives. In [30], the authors of [28] propose
another ORAM construction which also uses Bloom filter as a building block and propose to remedy
this problem by setting the number of underlying random hash functions of Bloom filters proportional
to the security parameter k, which bounds the required false positive rate.
[14] proposes another way to reduce the overhead of regular queries by using Cuckoo hash-
ing [31, 32] instead of regular hashing. In comparison with the original construction, Cuckoo hash-
ing maps n items to 2(1 + )n bins with the guarantee that at most a single item is mapped into a
bin. Comparing with the original ORAM, this approach also reduces the overall storage and commu-
nication/computational overhead by a factor of log n. Since [14], Cuckoo hashing has been used as a
primitive building block for many ORAM schemes [33–36].
1.2.2.2 Reducing the Overhead of Oblivious Sorting
In ORAM, a dominant part of the communication and computational overhead is incurred by the
oblivious sorting in the shuffling process. The sorting process is composed of many steps where the
client retrieves a pair of encrypted data items from the server, decrypts them and compares the results,
and stores a re-encrypted version of the sorted pair. The sorting must be oblivious in the sense that
the indices of the pair of items that are compared must not leak any information about the results of
previous comparisons. The original ORAM construction uses a sorting network for this purpose: if the
Batcher’s network [37] is used, the sorting incursO(n log2 n) comparisons, with a very small constant;
if AKS network [38] is used, the sorting incursO(n log n) comparisons, with a constant of about 6100.
To reduce the overhead of oblivious sorting, in [39], the authors propose a novel oblivious merge
sort algorithm that hides the order in which items are being pulled from each array that is to be merged.
The complexity of the new sorting algorithm is still O(n log n). But by using O(
p
n) client side
memory, the client reduces the number of accesses to the server during shuffling thus reduces the
amortized communication overhead to O(log2 n). This sorting algorithm is also used as a building
block in their subsequent ORAM schemes [28, 30, 40].
6Another oblivious sorting algorithm that is widely used in many ORAM schemes is the randomized
Shell sort proposed in [41]. This algorithm obliviously sorts an array in O(n log n) comparisons with
very high probability, where the O notation hides only a very small constant. This technique has be
employed by ORAM schemes proposed in [14, 33]. There are also other oblivious sorting algorithms
that are used in different ORAM constructions, such as the external-memory data-oblivious sorting
used in [33, 36].
1.2.2.3 Reducing the Worst-case Overhead and Round Trips
In the original ORAM (as well as in many ORAM schemes), though the amortized overhead is
sub-linear to the number of data items in the database, at some point of time, the client still needs
to shuffle the entire database thus incurs “worst-case” overhead as bad as 
(n). This worst-case
overhead makes ORAM unsuitable in many practical scenarios. As a result, de-amortized ORAM
schemes [30, 34, 35, 42–44] are proposed, which have the same access overhead for every request.
Though they proposes different techniques to de-amortize the ORAM overhead, they all share the same
high level idea: spreading the reshufing operation over time. In other words, these ORAM schemes
try to construct future layers of the hierarchy in the background, while still querying copies of current
layers. Different from the de-amortizing techniques proposed in [30,34,35,42,43], the ORAM scheme
proposed in [44] is “un-amortized” naturally. However, its overall construction is different from the
hash-based ORAMs and will be explained in the following section.
In ORAMs, a single query typically requires a number of O(log n) round trips, because the client
needs to retrieve data from each layer of the hierarchy and which data to retrieve at a layer depends on
the results of the previous layers. The overall delay of a single query may also be unsuitable in practical
scenarios. As a result, there are also efforts that try to minimize the round trips in ORAM [43, 45–47].
In [45], a constant round-trip protocol assuming n1=c client storage is introduced. The number of round
trips depends on the amount of client storage. The non-interactive cache-based ORAM presented
in [46] relies on s client storage to provide an amortized overhead of O(n=s). The idea is to add
previously unseen items to a cache, which gets shuffled back into the remote database when it fills.
This idea is revisited under different assumptions in [43], with security formalization, but still requiring
7client storage. In [47], the client folds an entire interactive sequence of ORAM requests into a single
query object that the server can unlock incrementally, to satisfy a query without learning its result. It
only takes a single round to perform a query.
1.2.3 Binary Tree Based ORAM
With the goal of achieving both poly-log amortized and worst-case cost, E. Shi et al. [44] proposed
a novel ORAM construction which is based on a complete binary tree structure. Different from hash-
based hierarchical ORAM, which stores data items in a sequence of buffers whose size grow at a
geometric rate, the binary tree based ORAM stores data items in a complete binary tree with depth
log n and each node in the tree contains a bucket large enough to store k data items, where n is the
number of data items in the database and k is the security parameter. Same as the hash-based ORAM,
the content of all the buckets is encrypted and the server does not know how many real data items are
stored in each bucket. On the other hand, each real data item corresponds to a leaf in the tree and the
client keeps an index file that maps a data item to its leaf.
When a data item is queried, the client looks up the index file and finds the leaf that the data item
corresponds to. Then the client accesses the entire path from the root to the leaf. In this process, the
client finds the requested data item along the path and at the end the client maps the data item to a new
random leaf and puts the re-encrypted data item into the root bucket. To prevent the root bucket from
overflowing, the client and server also run a background eviction process which pushes the data item
from its current bucket to one of the bucket lower down the tree. Which children bucket that a data
item will be pushed to depends on the leaf it corresponds to. This eviction process starts from the root
and continues until the parent node of a leaf. Due to the eviction process, the ORAM protocol does not
need to shuffle the entire database at all. Thus this ORAM construction is “un-amortized” naturally.
Another critical building block of the binary tree based ORAM is its recursive structure. Specifi-
cally, now we have a basic ORAM protocol works as afore-explained and the client maintains an index
file which stores n “addresses” of log n bits. Assuming that the size of each data item is greater that
2 log n bits, then the size of the index file will be less than half the size of the database. So the index
file itself can be stored in the same ORAM structure recursively, reducing the client storage by a factor
8of two with every level of recursion and in the end makes the client storage to be constant.
Based on [44], many improved ORAM constructions [48–53] have been proposed. Specifically,
one of the most recent binary tree base ORAM construction [49] has achievedO(log n) communication
overhead (under the assumption that the size of a data item is 
(log2 n)), which is the most efficient
solution with small client storage (O(log n)). On the other hand, due to it simplicity and efficiency,
the binary tree based ORAM is also used in many ORAM implementations and applications that use
ORAM as a primitive [54–59].
1.2.4 Other ORAMs
Other than the efforts that try to improve the efficiency of ORAM, there are also many other works
that aim to make ORAM more practical. For example, while most of the ORAM constructions assume
the “single-server-single-user” model, [36] proposes an ORAM construction for group user access with
stateless client and [60] proposes an ORAM construction where the server may exist on multiple cloud
platforms. [61] also proposes a read-only ORAM construction that can be used for data sharing among
multiple users while maintain the integrity of the data. There are also works that try to address practical
issues in real ORAM deployment. For example, [62] proposes an ORAM where the data owner can
delegate access privileges to different data users and [63] proposes a solution that protects the integrity
of the binary tree based ORAMs.
1.3 Main Contributions
In this dissertation, we investigate the protections of user’s access pattern privacy in un-trusted
storage, which is an important aspect for the comprehensive protection of user and data security. We
summarize the main contributions of our research as follows:
• We study the problem of how to protect access pattern privacy in a light-weight manner. We
proposed two solutions: the first solution is a basic scheme that protects a user’s access pattern
privacy in the long run and is light-weight when the size of the user database is limited. The
second solution improves the first solution by significantly improving the scalability and reducing
the asymptotic overhead by organizing the user database in a tree structure.
9• We conduct extensive analytical studies on the security properties of the proposed access pattern
privacy protection schemes. We present rigorous proofs to show that the basic scheme protects
a user’s access pattern in the long run. We also show that the improved scheme has the same
long-term security property as the basic scheme and the index files which are added to improve
the scalability of the scheme does not break the long-term security property. We also study the
convergence rate of the proposed schemes and show that the proposed solutions converge after a
reasonable amount of accesses.
• Based on the proposed access pattern privacy protection schemes, we study the problem of
privacy-preserving keyword-based query over encrypted data in un-trusted storage. We propose
a light-weight scheme that efficiently performs keyword based queries over the users encrypted
database while protecting the users query privacy with low overhead.
• We study the problem of maintaining user accountability when the outsourced data are shared
among multiple users and data access pattern is protected, specifically, by a hash-based hier-
archical ORAM. We propose an accountable ORAM scheme, which can detect misconduct by
malicious users and identify the attackers, while not interfering with the access pattern preserva-
tion mechanisms inherent from the underlying ORAM. We conduct extensive analysis to show
that the proposed solution addresses all types of user misbehavior and offers the same level of
protection to access pattern that is provided by the underlying ORAM scheme.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we study the problem of light-
weight access pattern privacy protection and propose two schemes: a basic scheme which incurs low
overhead when the size of the user database is limited, and an improved scheme which significantly
improves the scalability of the basic scheme. In Chapter 3, we present the proofs of the security prop-
erties of the schemes that are proposed in Chapter 2 and analyze their convergence rate. In Chapter 4,
we investigate the problem of query privacy protection and propose a scheme that performs keyword
based queries over the users encrypted database while protecting the users query privacy. In Chapter
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5, we study the problem of protecting access pattern privacy with user accountability and propose an
accountable ORAM scheme, which can detect misconduct by malicious users and identify the attack-
ers, while preserving the access pattern privacy. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a
summary of the main contributions and the potential extensions to the conducted research.
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CHAPTER 2. PROTECTION OF ACCESS PATTERN PRIVACY IN UN-TRUSTED
STORAGE
2.1 Introduction
To strictly protect the privacy of data access pattern, the intention of every data access operation
should be hidden so that observers of the operations cannot gain any meaningful information. Con-
forming to this strict requirement of access pattern privacy, two types of schemes have been proposed,
namely, private information retrieval (PIR) and oblivious RAM (ORAM), which has been discussed in
detail in Section 1.2. However, all these solutions incur very high overhead which may prevent their
usage in practice.
Although strict protection of data access pattern privacy is attractive, less strict protection, such as
protecting the privacy of long-term access pattern, is also very useful in practice. For example, a mali-
cious server may use the statistical data access pattern of a user to infer the user’s private information
or conduct stealthy attacks. Moreover, being light-weight is also highly desired by users nowadays, as
many of them often access the outsourced data with thin client devices such as smartphones.
Based on these considerations, we propose a light-weight scheme to preserve the privacy of long-
term data access pattern in this chapter. Rigorous proofs and extensive evaluations have been conducted
to demonstrate that the proposed scheme can hide the data access pattern in the long run, and the number
of accesses required to preserve the access pattern privacy is reasonable in many situations.
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2.2 Models and Assumptions
2.2.1 System Model
We consider a basic remote storage system with a server and a single user. The user stores its
sensitive data on the server, which in turn provides an online interface for the user to access the out-
sourced data. Later on, when the need for a data item arises, the user requests it from the server,
updates the data item after usage, and then uploads the updated data item back to the server. Similar
to [14, 15, 25–28, 30, 33–36, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47–50, 60–62, 64], we assume that all the data items stored
at the server have the same size so the server cannot identify a data item from its size. In practice, this
can be achieved conveniently by appending padding bits to short data items or dividing large data items
into smaller ones.
2.2.2 Security Model
We assume that the server is curious about the user’s private information and may launch malicious
attacks. Specifically, it may be interested in obtaining the user’s data access pattern over the long term,
which primarily includes the following information: which data items that have been requested by the
user and the number of times that a particular data item has been requested by the user.
If the access pattern information is obtained, the server may be able to launch various attacks. For
example, the server may attempt to infer the user’s activity pattern or private interest via tracking the
user’s access to some particular data items. The server may also launch focused attacks towards user’s
data that are accessed with very high frequency, or stealthily delete data that are never accessed to save
its storage and maintenance costs without being noticed by the user.
As for the user, we assume that it has a primitive encryption function that generates different cipher-
texts over different input, and the server does not have non-negligible advantage over the user at deter-
mining whether a pair of encrypted items of the same length represent the same data item. We assume
that data confidentiality and integrity are protected using existing techniques and the communication
channel between the user and the server is secured using mechanisms such as SSL/IPSec. We do not
consider DoS attacks or timing attacks as they can be addressed independently from this work.
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2.2.3 Design Goal
Our main design goal is to develop a light-weight solution to prevent the server from knowing the
user’s access pattern to the data stored at the server, while allowing the user to access the outsourced
data with low communication and computational overhead.
2.3 The Basic Scheme
2.3.1 Preliminaries
Before describing our proposed solution in detail, we first explain the system setup and the prelim-
inaries. We study a system where a user stores n different data items (denoted by di, i = 1;    ; n) at a
server. All data items are encrypted using the user’s secret key before uploading. After the user uploads
an encrypted data item to the server, the server returns the index of the data item’s storage location at
the server, which will be used later by the user to query the data item. We use Loc(i) to denote the
index of the storage location for data item di. For simplicity, we assume that Loc(i) ranges from 1 to
n, as shown in Fig. 2.1. E.g., Fig. 2.1 reads that the index of the storage location for data item d1 is j.
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Figure 2.1: System setup. The indices of the storage locations of all data items are recorded in a
directory file FLoc. All data items and FLoc are encrypted using the user’s secret key before being
stored at the server. FLoc is always stored at a fixed location with index 0.
The user records the location indices of all data items in a directory file, denoted as FLoc. When
trying to access a data item di, the user looks up FLoc for Loc(i), and then includes Loc(i) in the query
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to the server. Upon receiving a user query, the server returns the data item stored at the specified storage
location. To facilitate pervasive access to the data, FLoc is also stored at the server. Similar to all data
items, FLoc is encrypted with the user’s secret key. Therefore, before trying to access a data item, the
user first needs to download FLoc from the server; FLoc can then be stored and accessed at the user’s
local cache, thus saving the communication cost; after the user has completed the usage of the data
items, FLoc is updated, re-encrypted, and then uploaded back to the server.
In practice, for an individual user (e.g., a google doc user), the number of data items is usually
limited; therefore, the size of FLoc is reasonably small. For example, if the number of data items is less
than 220 – about one million, the size of FLoc is less than 220  log(220) bits which is approximately
3 MB – comparable to the size of an ordinary file. Since FLoc is used to facilitate user query and
execution of our proposed scheme, it does not contain any user data and the access pattern to FLoc
itself does not reveal the user’s private information. As a result, we are not concerned about protection
of the privacy of the access pattern to FLoc. Hence, in our scheme, FLoc is stored at a fixed location
(with index 0) at the server, as shown in Fig. 2.1.
We assume that the user requests the data items in rounds. To simplify the presentation, we assume
that the user requests a single data item in each round. The proposed scheme may be extended to
support requests of multiple data items in each round without much difficulty. In the following section,
we will explain our proposed scheme in detail. Table 2.1 lists the notations that will be used in the rest
of this chapter.
Table 2.1: Notations used in basic scheme
Notation Description
di the i-th user data item
Loc(i) the storage location of di at the server
I the set of all user data IDs
n the total number of user data items
M the number of data items accessed in each round
Ipre the set of IDs of data accessed in the previous round
IR the ID of data item desired by the user in the current round
Icur the set of IDs of data to be accessed in the current round
MA the number of data items in Icur
T Ipre
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Access Procedure of a User
Initialization
1: download(FLoc, 0); // download FLoc from storage location 0
2: decrypt(FLoc, userKey);
Query & Download
1: Ipre := FLoc:Ipre; // data accessed in the previous round
2: IR := userRequest(); // data desired by the user
3: Icur := fIRg; // data to be accessed in the current round
4: if IR 2 Ipre then
5: Icur := Icur [ randomSelect(MA   1 , Ipre   fIRg);
6: Icur := Icur [ randomSelect(M  MA , I   Ipre);
7: else
8: Icur := Icur [ randomSelect(MA , Ipre);
9: Icur := Icur [ randomSelect(M  MA   1 , I   Ipre   fIRg);
10: end if
11:  := Loc(Icur); // storage locations of data with IDs in Icur
12: queryNdownload(DATA, ); // download data from  locations
13: decrypt(DATA, userKey);
Re-encryption
1: for (j := 1; j 6M ; j++) do
2: encrypt(random nonce, DATA(j), userKey);
3: end for
Reshuffle & Upload
1: 0 := randomPermute();
2: FLoc:Ipre := Icur;
3: update(FLoc, Icur, 0);
4: encrypt(random nonce, FLoc, userKey);
5: upload(DATA, 0); // upload data to 0 locations
6: upload(FLoc, 0); // upload FLoc to storage location 0
2.3.2 Scheme Description
The key idea of our scheme is to conceal the user’s data access pattern by requesting extra dummy
data items (called dummies for short) at each round, in addition to the actual data item of the user’s
interest. The selection of dummies is critical in preserving the user’s access pattern privacy, which will
be discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2.1.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of our scheme. As shown in the code, after the Initialization
step where the user downloads the directory file FLoc, three steps are performed: Query & Download,
Re-encryption, and Reshuffle & Upload, which will be explained in the following sections. To help
explain the operations in these three steps, a simple example is given in Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: An example of the access procedure of a user. There is a total of n = 6 data items stored at
the server. We setM = 3; henceMA = maxf1; b3  3=6cg = 1. We use d0i to represent that data item
di appears differently after re-encryption. In this example, data items d2; d4; d5 were accessed in the
previous round. It shows how the user operates when it is interested in obtaining data item d3 in the
current round.
2.3.2.1 Query & Download
In our scheme, when the user is interested in obtaining a particular data item from the server, it
also requests a few additional dummy data items to conceal its true intent. Specifically, dummies are
selected so that the user’s request at each round has the same format:
• The total number of items requested by the user (including the data item of user’s interest and
dummies) remains the same, which is denoted asM (M > 1);
• TheM items requested at each round are selected uniformly randomly from all storage locations.
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In other words, out of M items, MA items are from the ones requested in the previous round,
where
MA = max

1;

M  M
n

: (2.1)
The other (M  MA) items are selected from the rest of the data. MA remains the same at each
round.
Note that Eq. (4.2) specifies that MA has a minimum value of one. This requirement is important
in guaranteeing that all rounds of accesses have the same format since the data item of user’s interest
in the current round may indeed be one of the items accessed in the previous round.
Specifically, the user selects the data items to access in the current round (whose IDs are denoted
as Icur) according to the following rules.
• If the data item of user’s interest (whose ID is denoted as IR) is one of the items accessed in the
previous round (whose IDs are denoted as Ipre), i.e., IR 2 Ipre, the user will (i) include IR in
Icur; (ii) select (MA 1) dummies uniformly randomly from Ipre fIRg; (iii) select (M MA)
dummies uniformly randomly from I   Ipre. (Refer to lines 5 and 6 in the Query & Download
step of Algorithm 1).
• On the other hand, if IR 62 Ipre, the user will (i) include IR in Icur; (ii) select MA dummies
from Ipre; (iii) select (M  MA   1) dummies from I   Ipre   fIRg. (Refer to lines 8 and 9 in
the Query & Download step of Algorithm 1).
In the example given in Fig. 2.2, we have n = 6 andM = 3; henceMA = 1. Since Ipre = f2; 4; 5g
and IR = 3, the user selects a dummy 4 from Ipre and a dummy 1 from I   Ipre fIRg = f1; 6g. As
a result, Icur = f3; 4; 1g. Then, the user looks up FLoc to find out the storage locations to be accessed
in the current round, which are (5; 3; 2).
2.3.2.2 Re-encryption
After the user completes the usage of the data items, it needs to re-encrypt all accessed data items in
Icur to ensure that the server cannot identify the data items from their appearances. In our scheme, this
is done by updating the random nonce that is padded at the head of each data item. For example, the
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nonce could be associated with the current time stamp to guarantee its uniqueness. Using the Cipher
Block Chaining encryption techniques [65], the cipher-texts of the same data item appear differently for
two encryptions with different choices of nonce. In this step, the same secret key can be reused for all
data items, which simplifies the key management at the user. Such re-encryption process ensures that a
computationally bounded adversary does not have non-negligible advantage at determining whether a
pair of encrypted data items (before and after re-encryption, respectively) carry the same data content.
2.3.2.3 Reshuffle & Upload
After re-encryption, the user selects a random permutation of the storage locations of the accessed
data items, and then uploads the data items back to the server at the new locations. This way, the
data items accessed at each round are reshuffled at the end of the round, hence hiding the access
pattern effectively. Note that after completion of the data access, the directory file FLoc is updated,
re-encrypted, and then uploaded back to the server.
In the example given in Fig. 2.2, the storage locations of the accessed data items are reshuffled to
be (3; 2; 5). Hence, the re-encrypted d03, d04, and d01 are uploaded to the server at storage locations 3, 2,
and 5, respectively.
2.4 The Improved Scheme
The basic scheme works well for individual users with reasonable number (e.g., < 106) of data
items. However, because the proposed solution uses a directory file FLoc, which records O(n) items’
storage locations, the scheme’s overhead increases linearly with the increase of data items. In this
section, we propose an enhanced scheme that improve the scalability of the basic scheme.
2.4.1 The Proposed Enhancement
2.4.1.1 Hierarchical Storage Structure at the Server
In addition to data items, the server stores a hierarchy of index files with the following features:
• As shown in Fig. 2.3, there is a total of T = dlogm ne > 1 levels of index files, wherem > 1 is
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Figure 2.3: Construction of the user data base. Data items and index files form a pyramid-like hierar-
chical storage structure at the server. Each index file records the storage locations ofm index files at its
next lower level. For example, the content of Itf(s;t) is shown in the callout box, and them level-(t 1)
index files associated with Itf(s;t) are shown as bold boxes in the figure. Here, f(s; t) =

s
mt

. To
obatin data item ds, the user performs a sequence of queries iteratively in a top-down manner, to obtain
T index files (marked as gray boxes), one at each level of the hierarchy.
a design parameter. In Section 2.6, we analyze the relation between m and the communication,
computational and storage overheads incurred by our solution. To simplify the presentation, we
assume that logm n is an integer in the rest of the paper.
• At level t (t = 1;    ; T ), there are nmt index files (denoted by Itj , j = 1;    ; nmt ). So the total
number of index files in the hierarchy is
TP
t=1
n
mt =
n 1
m 1 .
• Each index file records the storage locations ofm index files at its next lower level. Specifically,
Itj at level t contains the storage location information of the following index files at level (t  1):
It 1(j 1)m+1; I
t 1
(j 1)m+2;    ; It 1jm , as illustrated in the callout box in Fig. 2.3.
• There is only a single index file at the top level (i.e., level T ): IT1 .
• Data items form the bottom level (i.e., level 0) of the hierarchy.
• We assume that the files at different levels of the hierarchy are stored at non-overlapping storage
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spaces.
Note that, as shown in Fig. 2.3, there is no fixed order-correspondence between an index file (or a
data item) and its storage location. This is due to the design nature of our proposed scheme, whose key
idea is to randomize the storage locations of index files and data items after each access. Details of the
scheme will be discussed in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1.2 Iterative Query Process by the User
With such a pyramid-like hierarchical storage structure, we have the following observation about
the relation between a data item and its index files: the storage location of the data item ds is recorded in
the level-1 index file I1f(s;1), whose storage location information is in turn recorded in the level-2 index
file I2f(s;2), so on and so forth, till the top-level index file I
T
1 ; here, f(s; t) is defined as f(s; t) =

s
mt

.
This relation is illustrated in Fig. 2.3 as a linked chain of gray boxes from top level T to bottom level 0.
Based on the above observation, we know that the user can obtain the desired data item ds by
performing a sequence of queries to obtain these T index files in the chain: IT1 , I
T 1
f(s;T 1),    , I1f(s;1),
in a top-down manner through the hierarchy; once I1f(s;1) is obtained, the user gets to know the storage
location of ds and can then issue the final query to obtain the data item. After the access, the data items
and index files are updated, re-encrypted and uploaded back to the server.
Same as in Section 2.3, we assume that the user requests the data items in rounds. To simplify the
presentation, we assume that the user requests a single data item in each round. The proposed scheme
may be extended to support requests of multiple data items in each round without much difficulty. In
the following section, we explain our proposed scheme in detail. Table 2.2 lists the notations to be used
in the rest of this chapter.
2.4.2 Scheme Description
2.4.2.1 Scheme Overview
Our proposed scheme is executed every time when the user needs to request a data item. The key
ideas of the scheme include: (i) extra dummy data items and index files (called dummies for short) are
requested to hide the actual files of the user’s interest; (ii) multiple dummies are selected so that the
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Table 2.2: Notations used in the improved scheme
Notation Description
n the total number of data items
D the set of all data item IDs
m the number of storage locations recorded in an index file
Itj the j-th index file at level t of the hierarchy
(j; t) the set of IDs of files whose storage locations are recorded in the level-t index file of ID j
Lt the set of storage locations of level-t files
f(i; t) the ID of the index file that corresponds to data item di at level t
Qtpre(t > 1) the set of IDs and locations of level-t index files accessed in the previous round
Qtcur(t > 1) the set of IDs and locations of level-t index files to be accessed in the current round
Q0pre the set of IDs and locations of data items accessed in the previous round
Q0cur the set of IDs and locations of data items to be accessed in the current round
user’s request at each round has the same format, which is a necessity to hide the access pattern [27]
and (iii) the retrieved files are re-encrypted and re-positioned before being stored back to the server so
as to break the connections between files and their storage locations at the server. Generally, these rules
ensure that the connections between files and their storage locations are reshuffled gradually, become
more and more difficult to trace as the number of accesses increases, and eventually become fully
un-trackable. Detailed explanations and analysis will be presented in the following sections.
• Assumption: The following assumption is made on the initial condition when our scheme starts:
for any t = 1;    ; T   1, the mappings between level-t and level-(t   1) files are unknown to
the server. In other words, for any particular data item, the server has no knowledge about the
corresponding index files; similarly, for any particular index file, the server has no knowledge
about the corresponding index files at the upper layers.
• Data Structures Recording Access History: Our scheme makes use of past file access history
when selecting dummies. To facilitate such mechanism, the historical information about the
previous round of file access at layer t is recorded in a data structure denoted as Qtpre, which
consists of six fields: DR, DS and DS recording the file IDs, and LR, LS and LS recording
their storage locations, respectively. The data structures are stored in cipher-text in a designated
storage space at the server, and we denote the storage location of Qtpre as Hist[t].
• Structure of the Algorithm: The pseudo-code of our scheme is presented in Algorithm 2. The
scheme starts by selecting dummy data items. Then, it works iteratively to select, download,
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process and upload the index files, from the top level to the bottom level of the index hierar-
chy. In each iteration, it performs similar operations including Selection & Downloading, Ran-
dom Reshuffling, and Re-encryption & Uploading of index files. Finally, the desired data item
and the selected dummy data items are downloaded, randomly reshuffled, re-encrypted and up-
loaded. Detailed explanations of the operations are presented next, with a simple example given
in Fig. 2.4.
Algorithm 2 Proposed Access Procedure of a User
Step 1: Selection of Data Items (of IDsQ0cur:DR andQ0cur:DS ) to Access
1: Q0cur:DR  UserRequest(); k  UserKey(); // input user’s desired data and secret key
2: Download&Decryptk(Q0pre;Hist[0]);
// get access history of data items from location Hist[0] & decrypt it
3: ifQ0cur:DR 2 fQ0pre:DR;Q0pre:DSg then
4: Q0cur:DS  RandomSelectOne(D n fQ0cur:DRg);
5: else
6: Q0cur:DS  RandomSelectOne(fQ0pre:DR;Q0pre:DSg);
7: end if
Step 2: Query for Index Files and Data Items
1: Download&Decryptk(IT1 ; 0); // download top-level index file from location 0 & decrypt it
2: QTcur:DR  1;QTcur:DS  1;QTcur:DN  1;
3: for (t (T   1); t > 0; t  ) do
4: // Step 2.1: Selection of Level-t Index Files andQ0cur:LN
5: if t > 0 then
6: Download&Decryptk(Qtpre;Hist[t]); // get access history of level-t index files
7: Qtcur:DR  f(Q0cur:DR; t);Qtcur:DS  f(Q0cur:DS ; t);
// find out files storing level-t indices of data itemsQ0cur:DR andQ0cur:Ds
8: ifQtcur:DR = Qtcur:DS then
9: Qtcur:DS  RandomSelectOne((Qt+1cur :DR; t+ 1) [ (Qt+1cur :DS ; t+ 1) n fQtcur:DRg);
10: end if
11: end if
12: if fQtcur:DR;Qtcur:DSg  Qtpre then
13: Qtcur:LN  RandomSelectOne(Lt n fQtpre:LR;Qtpre:LS ;Qtpre:LNg);
14: else
15: ifQtcur:DR 2 Qtpre then
16: Qtcur:LN  RandomSelectOne(fQtpre:LR;Qtpre:LS ;Qtpre:LNg n fQtcur:LRg);
17: else
18: Qtcur:LN  RandomSelectOne(fQtpre:LR;Qtpre:LS ;Qtpre:LNg n fQtcur:LSg);
19: end if
20: end if
21: Download&Decryptk(Qtcur:fDR; DS ; DNg;Qtcur:fLR; LS ; LNg);
/* download files of IDsQtcur:fDR; DS ; DNg from locations specified byQtcur:fLR; LS ; LNg
respectively but in an arbitrary order & decrypt them */
// Step 2.2: Random Reshuffling
22: if RandomSelectOne(f0; 1g) = 1 then
23: Swap(Qtcur:DR;Qtcur:DS );
24: UpdateQtcur:fLR; LSg in level-(t+ 1) index files of IDsQt+1cur :fDR; DSg;
25: end if
// Step 2.3: Reencryption/Uploading of Level-(t+ 1) Files and Level-t Access History
26: Reencryptk&Upload(Qt+1cur :fDR; DS ; DNg;Qt+1cur :fLR; LS ; LNg);
/* reencrypt & upload files of IDsQt+1cur :fDR; DS ; DNg to locations specified by
Qt+1cur :fLR; LS ; LNg respectively but in an arbitrary order */
27: Reencryptk&Upload(Qtcur;Hist[t]);
28: end for
Step 3: Reencryption and Uploading of Accessed Data Items
1: Reencryptk&Upload(Q0cur:fDR; DS ; DNg;Q0cur:fLR; LS ; LNg);
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Figure 2.4: An example of the access procedure of a user. There is a total of n = 16 data items
and T = 2 levels of index files stored at the server. We use d0i to represent that data item di appears
differently after re-encryption. In this example, data items d1; d9; d10 were accessed in the previous
round. It shows how the user operates when it is interested in obtaining data item d3 in the current
round.
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2.4.2.2 Selection of Dummy Data Items
When the user intents to retrieve a data item (denote its ID by Q0cur:DR), it also requests the fol-
lowing dummy data items to conceal its intention:
• the first dummy (whose ID is denoted asQ0cur:DS): the dummy that may swap its storage location
with Q0cur:DR after access with a probability of 1=2;
• the second dummy (whose ID is denoted as Q0cur:DN ): the dummy that will not swap its storage
location with others.
Q0cur:DS and Q0cur:DN are selected to make sure that the user’s request at each round has the same for-
mat: the user always requests three data locations, out of which two and only two of them are from the
ones accessed in the previous round. Note that requiring user’s request at each round to have the same
format is necessary to hide the true access pattern [27]. Specifically, it hides the information about
whether user’s requests at two rounds are intended for the same data item. Also note that the second
dummy is needed in order to guarantee that each access can keep the same format. Detailed explana-
tions are presented in Section 2.4.2.3. To maintain the same format in each access, the data structure
Q0pre is downloaded from the server, which records the information about the data items (namely, the
data IDs and their corresponding locations) accessed in the previous round. Then, the dummies for the
current round are selected according to the following rules:
• For the first dummy (i.e., Q0cur:DS): (i) If the intended data item is the same as the intended data
item or the first dummy in the previous round, then the first dummy will be selected uniformly
at random from the set of all data items excluding the intended data item of the current round.
(ii) Otherwise, the first dummy will be randomly selected from the intended data item or the first
dummy in the previous round with equal probability. (Refer to lines 3 to 7 in Step 1 of Alg. 2.)
• For the second dummy (i.e., Q0cur:DN ), its selection depends on the selection results of the first
dummy: (i) If both the intended data item and the first dummy have appeared in the previous
round, the second dummy will be selected uniformly at random from the set of all data storage
locations excluding the locations accessed in the previous round. (ii) Otherwise, the second
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dummy will be selected uniformly at random from the locations accessed in the previous round
excluding locations of the already-selected files. (Refer to lines 12 to 20 in Step 2 of Alg. 2 when
t = 0.)
In the example given in Fig. 2.4, in the previous round, data #10 was intended by the user and
data #1 was selected as the first dummy. Since data #3 is needed in the current round (i.e., case (ii)
in the first dummy selection rules), the user randomly selects the first dummy, which is data#1 in this
example, from data #10 and data #1 (as shown by step 3). As the selected data items did not both
appear in the previous round (i.e., case (ii) in the second dummy selection rules), the second dummy’s
location, which is 7 in this example (as shown by step 15), is selected from data #10 and data #9’s
locations (i.e., data locations #7 and #11).
2.4.2.3 Reasons for Using Two Dummy Data Items
We now explain why our proposed scheme requires the user to download two dummy data items
together with the intended data item in each access.
Suppose the scheme only downloads one dummy data item (whose ID is denoted as Q0cur:DR)
together with the intended data item (whose ID is denoted as Q0cur:DS). We let the dummy data item
be selected to make sure that the user’s request at each round has the same format: the user always
requests two data locations, out of which one and only one of them is from the ones accessed in the
previous round. The rules for selecting the dummy data item are: (i) if the intended data item has
been accessed in the previous round, the dummy is selected uniformly at random from the data items
that have not been accessed in the previous round; (ii) otherwise, the dummy is selected from the two
accessed data items with equal probability.
Similarly, we would like to have the same format at each round of index file access: at each index
level, the user always requests two index file locations, out of which one and only one of them is from
the ones accessed in the previous round. Unfortunately, this may not always be possible with a single
dummy index file. An example is given in Fig. 2.5 to illustrate the problem.
In Fig. 2.5, suppose in the first round, the user needs data item d1 and data item d2 is randomly
selected to be the dummy. Since d1 and d2 share the same level-1 index file I11 , the user needs to
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randomly select a new dummy index file. Suppose the user selects I12 as the dummy index file. Then
in the second round, suppose the user needs data item d5. According to the selection rules, the user
randomly selects a dummy from d1 and d2. However, no matter whether d1 or d2 is selected as the
dummy, the user needs to retrieve I11 and I
1
2 in order to get the storage locations of d5 and the selected
dummy. Note that both I11 and I
1
2 have been accessed in the previous round; this violates the desired
access format.
A quick remedy to the problem may be as following: when selecting the dummy, the user randomly
selects the dummy from data items that do not share the same index files (except for the top level) with
the intended data item. It is easy to see that this selection rule can avoid the afore-described problem.
However, such remedial action may leak information about user’s access pattern in some situations.
For example, in Fig. 2.5, if the user accesses d1 consecutively, data locations where d2, d3 and d4 are
stored will never be accessed, which may leak information about the data item of user’s interest.
There may exist more sophisticated rules that can preserve the user’s long-run access pattern using
a single dummy, which we are not aware of at the moment. So instead, in this work, we adopt an
efficient two-dummy solution to guarantee that user’s access at each around has the same format.
2.4.2.4 Selection, Downloading, Processing and Uploading of Index Files
First, the single top-level index file is downloaded and decrypted, and its ID is recorded inQTcur:DR,
QTcur:DS , and QTcur:DN , i.e., QTcur:DR = QTcur:DS = QTcur:DN = 1 (as shown by step 4 in the example
of Fig. 2.4). Then, three index files for each level t, where (T   1) > t > 1, are selected, downloaded,
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processed and uploaded, in an iterative and top-down manner. Without loss of generality, the following
describes the operations for iteration t.
Selection & Downloading of Level-t Index Files The files that contain the level-t indices of
the intended data item (Q0cur:DR) and the first dummy (Q0cur:DS) are first selected to access. The
IDs of these files are denoted as Qtcur:DR and Qtcur:DS respectively. Note that, these file IDs can be
found out by using the afore-defined f(; ) function, i.e., Qtcur:DR = f(Q0cur:DR; t) and Qtcur:DS =
f(Q0cur:DS ; t). Then, similar to the selection of dummy data items, additional dummy index files are
selected to make sure that, in each round, three level-t index files are accessed and exactly two of them
appeared in the previous round. The following rules are applied in the selection:
• For the first dummy index file (i.e.,Qtcur:DS): If the intended data item and the first dummy share
the same level-t index file, the first dummy index file is re-selected uniformly at random from the
index files whose storage locations are stored in filesQt+1cur :DR orQt+1cur :DS , i.e., the level-(t+1)
intended index file and the first dummy index file downloaded in the previous iteration of this
algorithm. (Refer to lines 8 to 10 in Step 2 of Algorithm 2.)
• For the second dummy index file (i.e., Qtcur:DN ): (i) If the intended index file and the first
dummy index file have both appeared in the previous round, the second dummy index file will
be selected uniformly at random from all level-t index file locations excluding the locations that
appeared in the previous round. (ii) Otherwise, the second dummy index file will be selected
uniformly at random from the locations that appeared in the previous round excluding locations
of the already-selected files. (Refer to lines 12 to 20 in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 when t 6= 0.)
After the level-t index files have been selected, the locations of files Qtcur:DR and Qtcur:DS can be
found by searching their indices in the downloaded level-(t + 1) index files, i.e., files Qt+1cur :DR and
Qt+1cur :DS . Then the locations of the three level-t index files are provided to the server and the files
can be downloaded. Note that, the locations are presented to the server in an arbitrary order, so that
the server cannot distinguish between desired index files and dummies. The downloaded files are then
decrypted with the user’s key.
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In the example given in Fig. 2.4, since the intended data item and the first dummy share the same
level-1 index file I11 , the user randomly selects a new first dummy index file, which is I
1
3 in this example,
from level-1 index files fI12 ; I13 ; I14g (as shown by steps 6 and 7). Then the user looks up I21 to find out
the storage locations Q1cur:LR and Q1cur:LS (as shown by step 8). Since both I11 and I13 were accessed
in the previous round, the user selects the second dummy index file with location#4 (as shown by step
9). Hence, the user retrieves the files from level-1 storage locations #2,#3 and #4.
Random Reshuffling of Selected Level-t Index Files The intended index file (Qtcur:DR) and the
first dummy index file (Qtcur:DS) may swap their storage locations with a probability of 1=2. If the
swap happens, the index information of these files should be updated in their index files Qt+1cur :DR and
Qt+1cur :DS , respectively. In the example given in Fig. 2.4, since filesQ1cur:DR andQ1cur:DS are swapped,
the user updates I21 accordingly (as shown by steps 11 and 12).
Re-encryption & Uploading of Index Files Now, we have completed the processing of level-
(t + 1) index files Qt+1cur :DR, Qt+1cur :DS and Qt+1cur :DN . To hide content and/or location changes made
to them, these files should be re-encrypted before being uploaded back to the server. Similar to the
basic scheme, re-encryption is performed by applying the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption
techniques [65,66] on the file content, where the first block of the file is a non-reappearing nonce. Such
re-encryption process ensures that a computationally bounded adversary does not have non-negligible
advantage at determining whether a pair of encrypted data items (before and after re-encryption, re-
spectively) carry the same data content.
After re-encryption, files Qt+1cur :DR, Qt+1cur :DS and Qt+1cur :DN are uploaded to their locations, re-
spectively, but in an arbitrary order to make it difficult for the server to track these files. At the end of
iteration t, data structure Qtpre should be replaced by Qtcur, then re-encrypted and uploaded to location
Hist[t]. This way, next time when Qtpre is downloaded, it will reflect the mostly recent access history.
In the example given in Fig. 2.4, I21 and Q1cur are re-encrypted and uploaded to the server at the
storage locations #0 and Hist[1], respectively (as shown by step 13).
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2.4.2.5 Downloading, Processing and Uploading of Data Items
After the above steps, the level-1 index files have been downloaded and decrypted. Based on the
index information in these files, the desired data item and two additional dummy data items can be
downloaded from the server and decrypted with the user’s key. Upon the user’s access to the desired
data item has been completed, the intended data item and the first dummy may swap their storage
locations with a probability of 1=2, and if the swap happens, changes will be made to the level-1 index
filesQ1cur:DR and/orQ1cur:DS , respectively. Finally, the three level-1 index files and the three data items
are re-encrypted and uploaded to the server. Also, data structure Q0pre is updated to Q0cur, re-encrypted
and uploaded to the server. The re-encryption and uploading operations are performed in the similar
manner as described above.
In the example given in Fig. 2.4, the user looks up I11 to find the storage locationsQ0cur:LR = 5 and
Q0cur:LS = 4. As afore-explained, the user selects the second dummy’s storage location Q0cur:LR = 7
(as shown by steps 14 and 15). Since data items Q0cur:DR and Q0cur:DS are swapped, the content of I11
is updated (as shown by steps 17 and 18). Finally, the re-encrypted level-1 index files, Q0cur and data
items are uploaded to the server respectively.
2.5 Security Analysis and Assessment
In this section, we first present the formal security properties of the proposed schemes. Then we
discuss the practical implications of this security property through analyzing how our scheme can deal
with some typical attacks that are based on the knowledge of data access pattern.
2.5.1 Security Properties
The security properties of the proposed schemes can be formally described as the following two
theorems.
Theorem 1. In both schemes, if a user has accessed the data items for a sufficiently large number of
times, each data item is uniformly randomly distributed to all physical storage locations, despite the
user access sequence.
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Theorem 2. In the improved scheme, the cloud server cannot gain any advantage in inferring user’s
data access pattern through observing the access pattern of index file storage locations.
We defer the proof of the theorems to Chapter 3. Basically, Theorem 1 ensures that, after a suf-
ficiently large number of accesses, the server does not have non-negligible advantage at determining
whether a specific storage location corresponds to a particular data item. Therefore, it cannot infer the
frequency with which each data item has been accessed or the order with which the data items have
been accessed. Note that this property holds regardless of the user’s actual access pattern to the data
items.
On the other hand, in the improved scheme, index files are used to facilitate user query and data
access. The content of an index file is protected by being re-encrypted after each access, based on
the user’s secret key and a random non-repeating nonce. Hence, it is impossible for the server to gain
information about the data access pattern from the content of index files. Moreover, Theorem 2 ensures
that observing the access pattern of index file storage locations does not reveal more information about
data access pattern than observing only the access pattern of data storage locations. As a result, the
improved scheme achieves the same level of security as the basic scheme.
2.5.2 Security Against Typical Attacks
To further understand the practical implications of the above security property, we now discuss a
few typical attacks that are based on the knowledge of data access pattern, and analyze how our scheme
can deal with the attacks.
2.5.2.1 Security Against Attacking FLoc
In the basic scheme, FLoc is used to facilitate user query and data access. The content of FLoc
is protected by encryption with user’s secret key. Since FLoc is encrypted with a random nonce that
changes over time, it is impossible for the server to identify the relation between two different versions
of FLoc over time. Therefore, the access pattern to FLoc itself does not reveal the user’s access pattern
to data items. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.2, we do not consider denial of service attacks such
as alteration or deletion of FLoc, which may be dealt with using existing techniques.
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2.5.2.2 Security Against Tracking Data Items
Suppose the server has identified a particular user data item via other means, e.g., physical spying.
It may want to keep track of this data item thereafter. Using our proposed scheme, due to the property
described in Theorem 1, after a sufficiently large number of accesses, the server does not have non-
negligible advantage at determining which location the target data item is at. For example, in the basic
scheme, after the first round that the target item has been accessed, from the server’s perspective, the
target item may be stored at any of theM accessed locations with an equal probability of 1=M . Then
if any of theseM locations is accessed in the next round, the probability will be divided further among
the newly accessed locations. Therefore, by solely observing the storage locations accessed by the user,
the server could lose track of the target data item quickly.
2.5.2.3 Security Against Focused Attacks on Selected Data Items
Some of the users data items may be requested with very high frequency. These files are often
important to the user. If a malicious cloud server knows which data items are frequently accessed, it
may launch intensive attacks on the data, attempting to find out the content or contextual information
of the data. Note this, such attacks are sometimes feasible in practice, for example, when the adopted
data encryption algorithm or the key chosen by the user is not sophisticated enough, or some side
information about the data can be obtained in other means. Using our proposed scheme, due to the
property described in Theorem 1, all data storage locations will be equally accessed in the long run.
Hence, the server cannot identify which data items are frequently requested by the user. Similarly, some
of the users data items may be requested with very low frequency, e.g., backup data. A malicious server
may want to stealthily delete these rarely-accessed user data items to save storage and maintenance cost
for itself without being noticed by the user. Such attack can also be stopped as our proposed scheme
prevents the server from identifying rarely requested data items.
2.6 Overhead Analysis
In this section, we analyze the overhead of the proposed schemes. Due to the simplicity of the basic
scheme, we only present detailed analysis of the improved scheme. The overhead of both schemes are
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summarized in Table 2.3.
2.6.1 Communication and Computational Overhead
With the improved scheme, to access a single data item, the user needs to obtain the following
information from the server:
• Three index files at each level of the storage hierarchy; each index file records the storage loca-
tions ofm index files at its next lower level and it takes log n bits to represent a storage location.
• One access history file at each level of the storage hierarchy; each access history file records the
IDs and storage locations of three index files (at this level) that were accessed in the previous
round; hence, it contains six fields and each field is log n-bit long.
• The desired data item and two additional dummy data items; let  denote the size of each data
item in bits.
Recall that there is a total of logm n levels in our proposed hierarchical storage structure. There-
fore, the overall communication and computational overhead for accessing a single data item can be
calculated as:
OHc&c = m log n  3 logm n+ 6 log n  logm n+ 3: (2.2)
It is easy to verify that:
8><>: minOHc&c = OHc&cjm=4 = 9(log n)
2 + 3 ;
maxOHc&c = OHc&cjm=n = (3n+ 6) log n+ 3:
(2.3)
2.6.2 Storage Overhead
As explained in Section 2.4.1, the total number of index files in our proposed scheme is n 1m 1 . Each
index file records the storage locations of m index files at its next lower level and it takes log n bits to
represent a storage location. Therefore, the overall storage overhead at the server can be calculated as:
OHs server = m logn  n  1
m  1 + n: (2.4)
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It is easy to verify that:
8><>: minOHs server = OHs serverjm=n = n log n+ n ;maxOHs server = OHs serverjm=2 = 2(n  1) log n+ n: (2.5)
At the user side, to operate our proposed scheme, the user needs to store one access history file,
three index files, and three more index files or data items at any given time. Therefore, the required
storage at the user side is:
OHs user = 6 log n+ 3m log n+maxf3m log n; 3g: (2.6)
2.6.3 Overhead Comparison
Based on the above overhead analysis, we set m = 4 in our scheme. In Table 2.3, we compare
our scheme with one of the state-of-the-art access pattern preservation schemes for single-server sys-
tems [35].
Table 2.3: Overhead Comparison
Comm./Comp. Storage (server side) Storage (user side)
Basic Scheme O(n) +  O(n  ) O(n) + 
Improved Scheme (m = 4) O((log n)2 + ) O(nmaxflog n; g) O(maxflog n; g)
Scheme in [35] O(log2 n  ) O(n  ) O(n)
It is interesting to see that, as long as the size of a data item ( , in bits) is larger than log n where
n is the total number of data items, which usually holds true in practical cloud storage applications,
our scheme is more efficient. Specifically, our scheme (i) consumes similar storage space at the server;
(ii) usually incurs significantly less communication and computational overhead; and (iii) requires
significantly less storage space at the user, which facilitates the employment of our proposed scheme
on thin user devices such as mobile phones. Note that the better efficiency performance of our scheme
is achieved under a less stringent privacy requirement than [35]; instead of requiring strict privacy
protection to the data access pattern, our scheme aims to protect the privacy of the data access pattern
in the long run.
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2.7 Performance Evaluation
2.7.1 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, we have collected two user access traces from
two popular cloud storage service providers: Youtube [67] and Baidu [68]. As shown in Figs. 2.6(i)
and (ii), both the Youtube user and the Baidu user have 256 files stored at the server. Different files
have been accessed with different frequencies over time. Moreover, we have created an additional user
who always requests the same file from the server, called the SFA (Single File Access) user, as shown
in Fig. 2.6(iii). We use the SFA user to emulate an extreme access pattern. The total number of files
stored at the server for the SFA user is also 256.
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Figure 2.6: Data access traces and distribution used in the performance evaluation.
2.7.2 Preservation of Access Frequency Privacy
To study how well our proposed scheme preserves a user’s access frequency privacy, we propose to
use entropy to measure the distribution of the user’s access frequencies to different files. Specifically, let
Ci denote the number of accesses to the file stored at storage location i. Then, the access frequency to
location i is Fi = CiP
i Ci
, and the entropy of access frequency is HF =  
P
i Fi log(Fi). For example,
HF of the Youtube and Baidu traces is around 7.6 and 6.5, respectively, which can be calculated by
counting the number of accesses to each file in Figs. 2.6(i) and (ii). Clearly, for a given set of files
stored at the server, the maximum entropy is achieved when all file locations have been accessed with
an equal probability. This means that, the maximum entropy for accessing 256 files is HmaxF (256) =
 256 1256 log( 1256) = 8.
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We evaluate how the entropy of access frequency changes as the number of access rounds increases.
Fig. 2.7 plots the results (averaged over 100 simulation runs) for different access scenarios. It can be
seen clearly from the figures that, with our scheme, the entropy of access frequency improves over
the original trace, and converges gradually to the maximum entropy in all simulated scenarios. This
confirms our analytical study in Section 2.5 and Theorem 1 that the access frequency distribution
converges towards the uniform distribution in the long run.
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Figure 2.7: The entropy of access frequency vs. the number of access rounds for a particular simulation
run under different access scenarios. In (iii), because the SFA user always requests the same data item
at each round, the entropy of access frequency without using our proposed scheme is always zero,
which is not shown in the figure.
2.7.3 Preservation of Access Order Privacy
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in preserving the access
order privacy. We do so by evaluating the correlation between the output access sequences (i.e., the
sequence of the requested data items’ storage locations) for the same input access sequence (i.e., the se-
quence of actual data items requested by the user). Specifically, in each simulation run, we simulate the
access procedure using the same input access sequence twice and calculate the correlation coefficient
(denoted as ) between the two output sequences. A smaller  indicates that the two output sequences
are less correlated, and thus the access order privacy is better preserved. Note that, using our scheme,
the server observes accesses to three storage locations at each round. Therefore, it won’t be able to
get the exact sequence of the requested data items’ storage locations, which also helps to preserve the
access order privacy.
Figs. 2.8(i) plot the  values (averaged over 100 simulation runs) as the number of access rounds
increases for different access scenarios. We can see that  decreases as the number of access rounds
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increases, thus the correlation between the output sequences becomes looser. Notice that  never
reaches zero (i.e., perfect access order privacy) in the simulation, which is due to the randomness and
finite length of the output sequence. As a result,  remains at small values (e.g., < 0.1) after a number
of accesses.
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Figure 2.8: (i) Average correlation coefficient () between output sequences for the same input se-
quences with our proposed scheme. (ii) Average entropy of location distribution vs. the number of
access rounds for the most frequently requested data item. (iii) Average entropy of location distribution
vs. the number of access rounds for the least frequently requested data item.
2.7.4 Preservation of Data Item’s Location Privacy
As discussed in Section 2.5, when the user employs our proposed scheme, the server loses track of
a certain data item gradually over time. In other words, from the server’s perspective, the uncertainty
of a data item’s storage storage location increases gradually over time. Similar to the evaluation of
access frequency privacy, we also use entropy to measure the uncertainty of a particular data item’s
storage location from the server’s perspective. It is defined as HL =  
P
i pi log(pi), where pi is the
probability that the data item is at storage location i from the server’s perspective.
We evaluate how the entropy of the data item’s location distribution grows as the number of access
rounds increases. For each access scenario, we collect the statistics of the most accessed data item and
the least accessed data item, and results (averaged over 100 simulation runs) are plotted in Figs. 2.8(ii)
and (iii), respectively.
From the figures, we can see that a data item’s location distribution entropy reaches the maximum
regardless of their real access frequency. Note that, without our proposed scheme, a data item’s location
distribution entropy is zero because its location is fixed and known to the server.
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2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present two novel schemes to the preservation of a user’s access pattern privacy
in un-trusted storage. The basic scheme is light-weight in practice for users with reasonable number
of data items. The improved scheme significantly improves the scalability of the solution, as well as
reduces the asymptotic overhead. We also show that the improved scheme can provide full protection
to data access pattern privacy in the long run. Extensive evaluations have also been conducted to show
that the scheme can protect the data access pattern privacy effectively after a reasonable number of
accesses have been made.
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
In this chapter, we present detailed analysis of the security properties of the schemes that are pro-
posed in Chapter 2. Specifically, we first present the formal proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Then
we analyze the convergence speed for the proposed scheme to converge to uniform distribution.
3.1 Proof of Convergence
Theorem. In both schemes, if a user has accessed the data items for a sufficiently large number of
times, each data item is uniformly randomly distributed to all physical storage locations, despite the
user access sequence.
Proof. In the improved scheme, at each round of access, the user accesses three data items, where
two of them (DR and DS) randomly swap their locations after the access and the other DN does not.
Therefore, the selection of DN does not affect the location distribution of the data items. As a result,
the proof of theorem for the basic scheme can be applied to the improved scheme. To simplify the
presentation, we prove the theorem for the case of basic scheme withM = 2 andMA = 1. That is, at
each round of access, the user accesses two data items, where one of them is actually requested by the
user and the other is a dummy. Moreover, one and only one of the two data items is selected from the
ones accessed in the previous round.
Let di (i = 1;    ; n) denote the data items and Pi denote the probability with which di is actually
requested by the user in each round of access.
We model the data access process with a homogeneous Markov chain denoted as MC-1. Each state
of MC-1 is (; di dj). Here,  is a permutation of (d1;    ; dn), which stands for one distribution of
the n data items to n storage locations. For example,  = (d2 d3    dn d1) represents the situation
where data item d1 is at storage location n, item d2 is at location 1, item d3 is at location 2, and so
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Figure 3.1: One-step transition from an arbitrary state (d1 d2    di    dj    dn; di dj) to other
reachable states in MC-1. f(; ) is the transition probability function. Each row has n   2 reachable
states.
on and so forth. i and j are two distinct numbers from f1;    ; ng, and di and dj are the two data
items accessed by the user. Therefore, states (; di dj) and (; dj di) are identical. In addition, we
know that Pi + Pj > 0 because one of the two data items is actually requested by the user. To further
simplify the presentation, we assume Pi > 0 in this proof, though the proof can be readily extended to
the cases where Pi = 0. Hence, there is a total of n!

n
2

distinct states in MC-1.
Fig. 3.1 shows all possible one-step transitions from an arbitrary state denoted as (d1 d2    dn; di dj).
Each directed line from state (d1 d2    dn; di dj) to another state represents a possible one-step tran-
sition, and the label beside the line represents the transition probability, where function f(; ) is defined
as follows:
f(dx; dy) =
1
2
 Px  1
n  2 +
1
2
 Py  1
2
: (3.1)
For example, the transition probability from state
(d1 d2    di 1 di    dj dj+1    dk    dn; di dj)
to state
(di d2    di 1 dj    di dj+1    dk    dn; dj dk)
can be computed as follows. The above transition represents one of the following two cases:
• di and dj swap their storage locations at the end of the previous round; then, dj is actually
40
requested by the user in the current round while dk is selected as a dummy. The probability for
this case to occur is 12  Pj  1n 2 .
• di and dj swap their storage locations at the end of the previous round; then, dk is actually
requested by the user in the current round while dj is selected as a dummy. The probability for
this case to occur is 12  Pk  12 .
Consequently, the transition probability is
f(dj ; dk) =
1
2
 Pj  1
n  2 +
1
2
 Pk  1
2
: (3.2)
Denote the stationary distribution of MC-1 as . We now have the following observation:
Lemma 1.  exists and  is unique.
Proof. It is clear that the set of states of MC-1 is closed. Moreover, the set of states is also irreducible.
To prove the irreducibility, we need to show that an arbitrary state S=(; di dj) in this set inter-
communicates with another arbitrary state S0=(0; di0 dj0) in this set, i.e., S $ S0. We show this in
two cases:
Case 1: =0. Starting from S, the following process will result in S0: firstly, let us access di and
di0 , and do not swap the data items’ locations; secondly, let us access di0 and dj0 , and do not swap
the data items’ locations. The first step can be the result of requiring either di or di0 by the user. The
second step can be the result of requiring di0 by the user and dj0 is accessed as dummy. Apparently,
this process has a non-zero probability and so does the reverse process. Therefore, S $ S0.
Case 2:  6= 0. If  6= 0, one can easily convert  to 0 by swapping two elements in  at a time
in finite steps. For example, we can assign weight to elements in  according to the elements’ order
in 0. Then 0 can be obtained by sorting according to the assigned weight using a Batcher sorting
network [37]. The sorting process can be implemented by accessing the corresponding data items and
swap their locations in our scheme. Clearly, this process is also revertible. Then based on the discussion
in case 1, we can show that S $ S0.
Given that S $ S0, according to the definition, the set of states is irreducible. Note that the set of
states is also finite, therefore there exists a unique positive stationary distribution  for the MC-1. 
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Figure 3.2: Transition from state (i; j) to other reachable states (2 < i < j < n) in MC-2. f(; )
is the same as in Eq. (3.1). The transition probability from a reachable state to (i; j) is 2f(di; dj) or
2f(dj ; di). Each row has n  2 reachable states.
Next, we construct another Markov chain denoted as MC-2. Each state is denoted as (i; j), where i,
j are the indices of two different data items (i.e., i 6= j). States (i; j) and (j; i) are considered identical.
In MC-2, the state transition probability Pr ((i0; j0)j(i; j)) is defined as:
Pr =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2f(i0; j0); if i0 = i; j0 6= j or i0 = j; j0 6= i;
2f(j0; i0); if j0 = i; i0 6= j or j0 = j; i0 6= i;
0; otherwise:
(3.3)
Under this definition of transition probability, it can be checked that the sum of the probabilities of
arriving at other states from a paritcular state is one, which in turn validates that this artificially con-
structed chain is indeed Markovian. Fig. 3.2 shows an example of state transitions in MC-2. Clearly,
MC-2 has

n
2

states. Denote the stationary distribution of MC-2 as 0. Similar to Lemma 1, we have
the following observation:
Lemma 2. 0 exists and 0 is unique.
Proof. Omitted. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1. 
Let us denote the element corresponding to state (i; j) in 0 as 0i;j . According to the definition of
stationary distribution, we have:
0i;j = 2f(i; j)
X
k 6=i;j
0i;k + 2f(j; i)
X
k 6=i;j
0j;k: (3.4)
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Let us denote the element corresponding to state (; di; dj) in  as ;i;j . We next show that if
;i;j =
0i;j
n! ; 8, then  in this form satisfies
 = P; (3.5)
where P is the transition probability matrix of MC-1. Let us consider an arbitrary state (; i j) and
;i;j =
0i;j
n! . This state can be reached from exactly 4(n 2) other states. For each pair (u; v) satisfying
that u = di or dj , and v 6= di or dj , two of these states are of the form (; u v). For each of these states,
;u;v = 0u;v. Hence, Eq. (3.5) holds if and only if
2f(di; dj)
X
k 6=i;j
0i;k
n!
+ 2f(dj ; di)
X
k 6=i;j
0j;k
n!
=
0i;j
n!
: (3.6)
Eq. (3.6) holds as a result of Eq. (3.4). Therefore,
n
;i;j =
0i;j
n!
o
8;i;j
is a solution to Eq. (3.5). Given
the uniqueness of the stationary distribution, this also means that it is the stationary distribution of
MC-1.
Now, given the stationary distribution of MC-1, it can be easily calculated the probability of a
permutation of data items, say , as following:
Pr() =
X
i;j;i6=j
;i;j =
X
i;j;i6=j
0i;j
n!
=
1
n!
; (3.7)
which means that in the steady state, all permutations of data items are equally likely to happen. Con-
sequently, it implies that every data item is uniformly randomly distributed to all physical storage
locations in the steady state. 
3.2 Proof of the Index File Pattern Privacy
Theorem. In the improved scheme, the cloud server cannot gain any advantage in inferring user’s data
access pattern through observing the access pattern of index file storage locations.
Proof. We show that the server cannot gain any advantage from observing the access pattern of the first
level index files. The proof can be readily applied to the situations where the server can observe the
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access pattern of more levels of index files.
We denote the three data items and three index files that are accessed in the i-th round by two
unordered sets (Di;1; Di;2; Di;3) and (Ii;1; Ii;2; Ii;3) respectively. Therefore, up to the n-th round, there
are data access sequence (denoted as
 !
D) and index access sequence (denoted as
 !
I ) as follows:
 !
D = h(D1;1; D1;2; D1;3);    ; (Di;1; Di;2; Di;3);    ; (Dn;1; Dn;2; Dn;3)i; (3.8)
 !
I = h(I11 ; I12 ; I13);    ; (Ii1 ; Ii2 ; Ii3);    ; (In1 ; In2 ; In3)i: (3.9)
Moreover, after each access, two of the accessed data items (or index files) may swap their locations
with probability of 1=2. Hence, we define following two sequences of the swapping actions taken in
the accesses of data items (denoted as
  !
AD) and index files (denoted as
 !
AI) respectively:
  !
AD = hAD1;    ; ADn 1i; (3.10)
 !
AI = hAI1;    ; AIn 1i: (3.11)
Here, each ADi or AIi is an element of f0; 1; 2; 3g:
• When ADi (or AIi) is 0, it means no data items (or index files) swap at the end of the i-th round
of access.
• When the value is 1, it means Di;1 swaps with Di;2 (or Ii;1 swaps with Ii;2).
• When the value is 2, it means Di;1 swaps with Di;3 (or Ii;1 swaps with Ii;3).
• When the value is 3, it means Di;2 swaps with Di;3 (or Ii;2 swaps with Ii;3).
Note that
  !
AD and
 !
AI have a length of n   1, not n, because the swapping action taken after the n-th
access is not considered.
In fact, the server cannot directly observe the access sequences
 !
D or
 !
I because the mapping
between data items (or index files) and their locations is unknown to the server. Particularly, for the i-th
round of access, the server can only observe user’s access to (i) three data storage locations, denoted
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as(DLi;1; DLi;2; DLi;3), and (ii) three index file storage locations, denoted as (ILi;1; ILi;2; ILi;3).
Therefore, the server can observe the following data location access sequence (denoted as
 !
DL) and
index file location access sequence (denoted as
 !
IL) respectively:
 !
DL = h(DL1;1; DL1;2; DL1;3);    ; (DLi;1; DLi;2; DLi;3);    ; (DLn;1; DLn;2; DLn;3)i; (3.12)
 !
IL = h(IL1;1; IL1;2; IL1;3);    ; (ILi;1; ILi;2; ILi;3);    ; (ILn;1; ILn;2; ILn;3) > : (3.13)
To prove that the server cannot gain any advantage in inferring user’s data access pattern through
observing the index files’ access pattern, we show the following:
Pr(
 !
D j !DL; !IL) = Pr( !D j !DL); (3.14)
which means the probability that
 !
D is the actual data access sequence when the data location access
sequence
 !
DL and the index file location access sequence
 !
IL are both observed, is the same as the
probability that
 !
D is the actual data access sequence when only the data location access sequence
 !
DL
is observed. In other words, there is no difference between observing both
 !
IL and
 !
DL and observing
only
 !
DL in terms of the capability to infer the data access pattern. This equality is equivalent to
Pr(
 !
D j !DL)Pr( !ILj !DL) = Pr( !D; !ILj !DL): (3.15)
In the following, we prove Eq. (3.15) through computingPr(
 !
D j !DL), Pr( !ILj !DL) andPr( !D; !ILj !DL).
Computation of Pr(
 !
D j !DL) We show that, given an observed data location access sequence
 !
DL, for any swapping action sequence
  !
AD0 (note: there are totally 4n 1 such action sequences), there
exists a unique data access sequence
 !
D 0 such that: if data items are accessed in sequence
 !
D 0 with the
swapping action sequence
  !
AD0 taken, the resulting data location access sequence is
 !
DL. Hereafter, we
use EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) =
 !
DL to represent the relation among the three sequences.
Let f(loc) store the ID of the data item stored at location loc. Suppose that, before the first round
of data access made through our scheme, the initial value of f(loc) for each data storage location loc
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has been assigned.
Sequence
 !
D 0 is defined recursively as follows.
The data items accessed in the first round are
(D01;1 = f(DL1;1); D
0
1;2 = f(DL1;2); D
0
1;3 = f(DL1;3)): (3.16)
To determine (D0i;1; D
0
i;2; D
0
i;3) for i > 0, the following changes should be made to f() at the end
of the i-th round of access:
• If AD0i 1 = 1, then f(DLi 1;1) = D
0
i 1;2 and f(DLi 1;2) = D
0
i 1;1. This means data items
D0i 1;1 and D
0
i 1;2, which are accessed in the (i  1)-th round, swap their locations.
• If AD0i 1 = 2, then f(DLi 1;1) = D
0
i 1;3 and f(DLi 1;3) = D
0
i 1;1. This means data items
D0i 1;1 and D
0
i 1;3 swap their locations.
• If AD0i 1 = 3, then f(DLi 1;2) = D
0
i 1;3 and f(DLi 1;3) = D
0
i 1;2. This means data items
D0i 1;2 and D
0
i 1;3 swap their locations.
Note that, no changes are made to f(), i.e., no data items are swapped, if AD0i 1 = 0.
Then, the data items accessed in the i-round are
(D0i;1 = f(DLi;1); D
0
i;2 = f(DLi;2); D
0
i;3 = f(DLi;3)): (3.17)
To show the uniqueness of
 !
D 0 with given
 !
DL and
  !
AD0, we prove by contradiction. Suppose
EXE(
 !
D 00;
  !
AD0) =
 !
DL, and
 !
D 0 and
 !
D 00 are different. If
 !
D 0 and
 !
D 00 are different starting from the i-th
round of access. So, EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) and EXE(
 !
D 00;
  !
AD0) are identical for the first i-1 rounds of access
and the mappings between data items and their locations are identical up to the end of the (i-1)-th
round of access. Therefore, as the i-th element of
 !
D 0 and
 !
D 00 are different, the corresponding accessed
locations should also be different. Thus EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) and EXE(
 !
D 00;
  !
AD0) are different at least for
the i-th element; that is, EXE(
 !
D 00;
  !
AD0) 6=  !DL, which is a contradiction.
Based on the above reasoning, we can conclude that: given
 !
DL, there are exactly 4n 1 pairs
of (
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) such that EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) =
 !
DL. Further assume that, given
 !
D , there are exactly t
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swapping action sequences
  !
AD(1);    ;  !AD(t) such that EXE( !D;  !AD(i)) =  !DL (i = 1;    ; t). Then,
we have
Pr(
 !
D j !DL) = t=4n 1: (3.18)
Computation of Pr(
 !
ILj !DL) If data access sequence  !D 0, applying data sequence swapping ac-
tion sequence
  !
AD0, and index file location access sequence
 !
IL0, applying index file swapping action
sequence
 !
AI 0, result in data access location sequence
 !
DL, then we denote the above relation among
these sequences as
EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0;
 !
IL0;
 !
AI 0) =
 !
DL: (3.19)
Given
 !
DL, assume there are totally K 4-tuples (
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0;
 !
IL0;
 !
AI 0) resulting in
 !
DL. Next, we
need to compute how many 4-tuples (
 !
D 0,
  !
AD0,
 !
IL,
 !
AI 0) that can result in
 !
DL, given
 !
IL and
 !
DL.
Firstly, let us suppose there are s pairs of index file swapping action sequence and data access
sequence, denoted as (
 !
AI(i);
 !
D (i)) (i = 1;    ; s), such that
EXE(
 !
D (i); 0n 1;
 !
IL;
 !
AI(i)) =
 !
DL; (3.20)
where 0n 1 represents the action sequence in which there is no swapping taken for every round.
Starting from the s 4-tuples (
 !
D (i); 0n 1;
 !
IL;
 !
AI(i)) of sequence that result in
 !
DL, we can find
s  4n 1 4-tuples resulting in  !DL as follows. Specifically, for each data swapping sequence   !AD(j)
(note: there are totally 4n 1 such sequences and thus j = 1;    ; 4n 1), we can obtain a data access
sequence
 !
D (j) and index file swapping sequences
 !
AI(i;j) for i = 1;    ; s, as follows:
• Given
  !
AD(j),
 !
D (j) is the sequence constructed according to the recursive definition described in
the previous subsection (i.e., computation of Pr(
 !
D j !DL)) to satisfy EXE( !D (j);  !ADj) =  !DL.
• For each i = 1;    ; s and each round r = 1;    ; n  1, the index file swapping action (denoted
as AI(i;j)r ) taken by index access sequence IL is determined as follows:
– Case I: the data swapping action taken in this round, i.e., AD(j)r , is 0. AI
(i;j)
r = AI
(i)
r .
– Case II: AD(j)r = 1. If data items D
(j)
r;1 and D
(j)
r;2 are indexed by two different index files,
e.g., the files at ILr;1 and ILr;2 without loss of generality, swapping between ILr;1 and
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ILr;2 should be taken before the swapping action indicated by AI
(i)
r is taken. Note that,
these two actions can always be combined to result in a single swapping action indicated
by 0, 1, 2 or 3, which becomes AI(i;j). Otherwise, AI(i;j)r = AI
(i)
r .
– Case III: AD(j)r = 2. If data items D
(j)
r;1 and D
(j)
r;3 are indexed by two different index files,
e.g., the files at ILr;1 and ILr;2 without loss of generality, swapping between ILr;1 and
ILr;2 should be taken before the swapping action indicated by AI
(i)
r is taken. Otherwise,
AI
(i;j)
r = AI
(i)
r .
– Case IV: AD(j)r = 3. If data items D
(j)
r;2 and D
(j)
r;3 indexed by two different index files,
e.g., the files at ILr;1 and ILr;2 without loss of generality, swapping between ILr;1 and
ILr;2 should be taken before the swapping action indicated by AI
(i)
r is taken. Otherwise,
AI
(i;j)
r = AI
(i)
r .
It is easy to prove that, for each of the above-constructed pair of
 !
D (i;j) and
 !
AI(i;j), it holds that
EXE(
 !
D (j);
  !
AD(j);
 !
IL;
 !
AI(i;j)) =
 !
DL: (3.21)
Also, it can be proved that there is no other 4-tuple can result in the given
 !
DL, with given
 !
IL. In sketch,
let us suppose there is a 4-tuple (
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0;
 !
IL;
 !
AI 0) resulting in
 !
DL, but this 4-tuple is not included
in the 4-tuples that we have found. Then, a 4-tuple (
 !
D 00; 0n 1;
 !
IL;
 !
AI 00) can be found by applying the
above steps, where the
  !
AD(j) is substituted by
  !
AD0 and
 !
AI(i) is substituted by
 !
AI 0. Obviously,
  !
AD00
and
 !
D 00 satisfy Eq. (3.20). So,
  !
AD00 must be one of the
  !
AD(i) (i = 1;    ; s), and therefore ( !D 0,   !AD0,
 !
IL,
 !
AI 0) should have been included in the 4-tuples that we have found already.
Hence,
Pr(
 !
ILj !DL) = s 4n 1=K: (3.22)
Computation of Pr(
 !
D;
 !
ILj !DL) As assumed in the computation of Pr( !ILj !DL), there are to-
tally K 4-tuples (
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0;
 !
IL0;
 !
AI 0) that result in
 !
DL. Hence, to compute Pr(
 !
D;
 !
ILj !DL), we need
to find the number of pairs (
  !
AD0;
 !
AI 0) such that
EXE(
 !
D;
  !
AD0;
 !
IL;
 !
AI 0) =
 !
DL: (3.23)
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According to the computation ofPr(
 !
D j !DL), there are  !AD(j) (j = 1;    ; t) such that EXE( !D;  !AD(j)) =
 !
DL. According to the computation of Pr(
 !
ILj !DL), for each   !AD(j), there are  !D (j) and  !AI(i;j)
(i = 1;    ; s) such that
EXE(
 !
D (j);
  !
AD(j);
 !
IL;
 !
AI(i;j)) =
 !
DL: (3.24)
Given
 !
DL and
  !
AD0, as proved above, there is exactly one
 !
D 0 such that EXE(
 !
D 0;
  !
AD0) =
 !
DL. There-
fore, we have
 !
D (j) =
 !
D for j = 1;    ; t. That is, there are t  s pairs of (  !AD(j); !AI(i;j)) such
that
EXE(
 !
D;
  !
AD(j);
 !
IL;
 !
AI(i;j)) =
 !
DL: (3.25)
It can also be proved that, no other pairs of data and index file swapping action sequences can satisfy
the above condition. In sketch, if there is some pair
  !
AD0 62 f  !AD(1),    ,  !AD(t)g that satisfies the above
condition, then we have EXE(
 !
D ,
  !
AD0) =
 !
DL, which is impossible. If a pair (
  !
AD(j);
 !
AI 0 6=  !AI(i;j))
can satisfy the above condition, the mapping relation between data items and index file locations will
be different from the case when the pair is (
  !
AD(j);
 !
AI(i;j)), which will cause the sequence
 !
IL to be
incompatible with
 !
D .
Therefore, there are exactly t s pairs of (  !AD0; !AI 0) satisfying Eq. (3.23). Hence,
Pr(
 !
D;
 !
ILj !DL) = t s=K: (3.26)
Summary Based on the above computations, it holds that
Pr(
 !
D j !DL)Pr( !ILj !DL) = (t=4n 1)(s 4n 1=K) = t s=K = Pr( !D; !ILj !DL):

3.3 Analysis of Convergence Rate
As shown in the previous sections, using the proposed schemes, every data item is uniformly ran-
domly distributed to all storage locations in the steady state of MC-1. In this section, we analyze the
convergence rate of the proposed scheme. Specifically, we are interested in finding how many accesses
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are needed before every data item become uniformly randomly distributed to all storage locations. Ap-
parently, different true access patterns may result in different convergence rates. In this dissertation,
we will present the analysis of the convergence rate under one particular access pattern, in which the
user always requests the same data item as its true target. The convergence rates for more compli-
cate access patterns are much more difficult to analyze and we will investigate them in our future work.
Nevertheless, the analysis of convergence rate we present in this dissertation will provide some insights
about how fast the proposed scheme converges.
In the following analysis, we use a Markovian process, denoted as MC-2, which is similar to but
simpler than MC-1. Specifically, each state in MC-2 is a permutation of (d1;    ; dn), which stands for
one distribution of the n data items to n storage locations. For simplicity, we assume that data item d1
is the target data item in each access, i.e., DR = d1. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the selection
of DN does not affect the distribution of data items’ storage locations. Hence, we only consider the
behavior of DR and DS in the following analysis. Given the assumption that DR = d1 in each access,
then DS is selected uniformly at random from all the data items, excluding d1 (see Section 2.4.2). In
other words, in each round DS may be any data item from fd2;    ; dng with equal probability, which
is 1=(n  1).
3.3.1 Preliminaries
In literature, many methods have been proposed to study the convergence rate of a Markovian
process. Our analysis of the convergence rate is based on the relation between the convergence rate and
the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix. Specifically, our analysis of MC-2’s convergence
rate is based on the following fact.
Lemma 3. Given a Markovian process with initial state vector 0 = f0;1; 0;2;    ; 0;ng, the state
vector afterm steps m = fm;1; m;2;    ; m;ng and the steady state vector  = f1;    ; ng, it has
supj2E jm;j   j j = O(j2jm); (3.27)
where E = f1;    ; ng, and 2 < 1 is the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix.
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Eq. (3.27) implies that, for a Markovian process, the convergence rate from an arbitrary initial state
to the steady state is upper-bounded by the rate that j2jm approaches zero, wherem is the number of
steps. For example, suppose the system requires that supj2E jm;j   j j  , where  > 0. If we let
cj2jm  ; (3.28)
which is equivalent to
m  log2   log2 c = O(log2 ); (3.29)
then we will get supj2E jm;j   j j   after O(log2 ) steps. In our following analysis of the
convergence rate, we will firstly find 2 for the transition matrix of MC-2. Then we can find an upper-
bound for the convergence rate MC-2 based on the value of 2.
3.3.2 The Transition Matrix of MC-2
Denote each state of MC-2 as i (i = 1;    ; n!), which stands for one distribution of the n data
items to n storage locations. Then according to the scheme, the transition function g(i; j) from a
state i to another state j is defined as following:
• g(i; j) = 12 , if i = j , which means that each data item’s storage location does not change
after one access. This situation is resulted from DR and DS not swapping their locations at
the end of the access. Note that DR = d1 and there are n   1 possible choices of DS and the
probability of swapping is 1/2, thus g(i; j) = 12  1n 1  (n  1) = 12 .
• g(i; j) = 12(n 1) , if i and j differs only in d1’s location and one of the rest of data items
location. In this case, it means thatDR andDS swap their locations at the end of the access. For
example, suppose i = (d1, d2, d3,    , dn) and j = (d2, d1, d3,    , dn), then i may transit to
j if d2 is selected as the first dummy data item and d1 and d2 swap their locations at the end of
the access.
• Otherwise, g(i; j) = 0. For example, suppose i = (d2, d3, d1, d4,    , dn) and j = (d3, d2,
d1, d4,    , dn), then f(i; j) = 0, because there is no way that d3 and d2 swap their locations
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in one access while d1 is the true target.
Note that in the proposed scheme, transitions between two states are symmetric, i.e., g(i; j) =
g(j ; i)
As an example, let n = 3, thus there are in total 3! = 6 states in MC-2. Note that in practice, if
n = 3, our scheme will always retrieve the whole database. However, without loss of generality, we
use n = 3 to simplify the presentation. Fig. 3.3 shows the transition matrix for this process, from
which we can get the transition probability between different states. For example, Fig. 3.3 reads that
the transition probability between states (1 2 3) and (2 1 3) is 1/4, which is 12  13 1 .
State (1 2 3) (2 1 3) (1 3 2) (2 3 1) (3 1 2) (3 2 1) 
(1 2 3) 1/2 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 
(2 1 3) 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 0 0 
(1 3 2) 0 0 1/2 1/4 1/4 0 
(2 3 1) 0 1/4 1/4 1/2 0 0 
(3 1 2) 0 0 1/4 0 1/2 1/4 
(3 2 1) 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 1/2 
 
Figure 3.3: Example transition probabilities between states when n = 3. Each parenthesised sequence of num-
bers represents a distribution of data items to different locations. For example, (1 2 3) denotes that data item d1,
d2, and d3 are stored in locations 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
It is easy to calculate that, when n = 3, the transition matrix has the second largest eigenvalue
2 = 3/4. Therefore, according to Equation (3.27), the rate at which an arbitrary state converges to the
steady state is upper-bounded by the rate at which (34)
m approaches zero asm (the number of accesses)
increases. As afore-explained in Section 3.3.1, we will get supj2E jm;j   j j  , where  > 0, after
O(log 3
4
) steps (i.e., data accesses). For example, if we let  = 1=nc, the process will converge in
O(log 3
4
1
nc ) = O(c log 43 n) = O(log n) steps.
3.3.3 The Second Largest Eigenvalue of MC-2
Before we present the analysis of the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix, we describe
how we organize the transition matrix to simplify the proof. Apparently, the order in which different
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states appear in the rows and columns of the transition matrix affects the representation of the transition
matrix. In the following, we describe our way of organizing the transition matrix, by explaining how
to get the transition matrix for a system of n+ 1 data items (denoted as n+1) based on the transition
matrix of n data items (denoted as n). Specifically, n+1 can be considered as the addition of two
matrices, namely, matrix n+1;A which is derived from n, and matrix n+1;B . Fig. 3.4 shows a
high-level illustration of these two matrices. Specifically:
• In n+1;A (as shown in Fig. 3.4(i)), the sub-matrices corresponding to states from the same
groups are the same as n multiplying n 1n . The rest of the entries in n+1;A are all zero.
• In n+1;B (as shown in Fig. 3.4(ii)), the diagonal entries are all 12n . In addition, for each
row/column, there is only one non-zero entry besides the diagonal entry, which is also 12n .
Πn
0
0
...
(x ... dn+1 x) (dn+1 x … x)...
(x ... x dn+1)
(x ... dn+1 x)
(dn+1 x … x)
..
.
(x ... x dn+1) n
n-1
Πnn
n-1
Πnn
n-1
1/2n
...
...
(x ... dn+1 x) (dn+1 x … x)...
(x ... x dn+1)
(x ... dn+1 x)
(dn+1 x … x)
..
.
(x ... x dn+1)
1/2n
1/2n
1/2n
0 1/2n 0
(i) n+1;A (ii) n+1;B
Figure 3.4: Illustration of n+1;A and n+1;B .
We claim that the second largest eigenvalue, 2, for the transition matrix that we described previ-
ously is 1  12(n 1) , where n is the number of data items. The rest of this section presents the proof of
this claim. We firstly prove in Section 3.3.3.1 that 1  12(n 1) is one of the eigenvalues for the transition
matrix with n data items. We then show in Section 3.3.3.2 that 1  12(n 1) is indeed the second largest
eigenvalue of the transition matrix.
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3.3.3.1 1  12(n 1) is an eigenvalue of the transition matrix
Lemma 4. For a system with n data items, the afore-described transition matrix of MC-2 has one of
its eigenvalues n as 1  12(n 1) , with one of its corresponding eigenvector Vn as the following:
Vn =
8>><>>:
f0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 1g; if n = 3
ffVn 1gn 1;0n 1g ; if n > 3
(3.30)
where fVn 1gn 1 is the concatenation of n  1 copies of Vn 1, and 0n 1 is an ((n  1)!)-entry zero
vector.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. Let n denote the transition matrix of interest. Generally,
for an eigenvalue n with its eigenvector Vn, we have
(n   nIn)Vn = 0n; (3.31)
where In stands for the (n!) (n!) identity matrix and 0n is an (n!)-entry zero vector.
It is easy to verify that when n = 3, f0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 1g is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 3/4 for the
matrix shown in Fig. 3.3. In the following, we will show that Vn = ffVn 1gn 1;0n 1g when n > 3.
Suppose Vn is an eigenvector in the format of Eq. (3.30), with eigenvalue n = 1   12(n 1) . That
is,
(n   nIn)Vn = 0n: (3.32)
As afore-explained,
n+1 = n+1;A +n+1;B: (3.33)
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Given that n = 1  12(n 1) and n+1 = 1  12n , therefore,
(n+1   n+1In+1)Vn+1
=

n+1;A   n  1
n
nIn+1

+

n+1;B   1
n
In+1

Vn+1
=

n+1;A   n  1
n
nIn+1

Vn+1
+

n+1;B   1
n
In+1

Vn+1:
(3.34)
Based on the relation between n+1;A and n (as shown in Fig. 3.4(i)), and given that Eq. (3.32)
holds and Vn+1 = ffVngn;0ng, it is easy to see that the first item of Eq. (3.34) is equal to 0n+1, i.e.,

n+1;A   n  1
n
nIn+1

Vn+1 = 0n+1: (3.35)
Now we show that the second item of Eq. (3.34), i.e.,
 
n+1;B   1nIn+1

Vn+1, is also equal to
0n+1. Let 0n+1;B =
 
n+1;B   1nIn+1

. From Fig. 3.4(ii), we can see that 0n+1;B differs from
n+1;B only in the diagonal entries: diagonal entries in 0n+1;B are   12n whereas diagonal entries in
n+1;B are 12n . Because each row of 
0
n+1;B only has two non-zero entries, we observe the following
facts when scalar-multiplying each row of 0n+1;B with Vn+1: the diagonal entry and the other non-
zero entry are multiplying the same value, either 0, 1 or -1. Specifically,
• If the diagonal entries is multiplying 0, the other non-zero entry of this row is also multiplying 0.
• If the diagonal entries is multiplying 1, the other non-zero entry of this row is also multiplying 1.
• If the diagonal entries is multiplying -1, the other non-zero entry of this row is also multiplying
-1.
As a result, the scalar multiplication of each row of 0n+1;B and Vn+1 is 0, which means that

n+1;B   1
n
In+1

Vn+1 = 0n+1: (3.36)
Therefore, formula (3.34) is equal to 0n+1. As a result, n+1 = 1  12n is an eigenvalue for n+1 and
its eigenvector Vn+1 = ffVngn;0ng. 
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3.3.3.2 1  12(n 1) Is the Second Largest Eigenvalue
Lemma 5. If 0 > 1  12(n 1) is an eigenvalue for the afore-described transition matrix of MC-2 with
n data items, then 0 = 1.
Proof. We will also use induction to prove the lemma. Firstly, as shown in Section 3.3.2, when n = 3,
the only eigenvalue that is greater than 1  12(n 1) = 34 is 1.
Now assume n = 1   12(n 1) is the second largest eigenvalue for n, while there exists  > 0
such that 0n+1 = 1  12n +  is the second largest eigenvalue (i.e., 0n+1 < 1) for n+1. Denote one of
its corresponding eigenvectors as
V 0n+1 = fv1; v2; :::; vmg; (3.37)
wherem = (n+ 1)!. Therefore, we have
(n+1   0n+1In+1)V 0n+1 = 0n+1; (3.38)
which is equivalent to  
n+1   0n+1In+1

V 0n+1
=

n+1;A   n  1
n
(n + )In+1

V 0n+1
+

n+1;B   1
n
In+1

V 0n+1 = 0n+1:
(3.39)
It is easy to see that in the second item of the above equation, i.e.,
 
n+1;B   1nIn+1

V 0n+1, there is
one group whose summation is 0n. Given that the overall summation equals 0n+1, there must be one
group in
 
n+1;A   n 1n (n + )In+1

V 0n+1, whose result is also 0n. This mean that there exists an
eigenvalue n = 1  12(n 1) +  for n, which contradicts to our assumption. 
3.3.4 Analysis of the Convergence Rate
Now given the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix, we now can analyze the conver-
gence rate of MC-2 based on Lemma 3. Specifically, suppose we define convergence as
supj2E jm;j   j j = O(j2jm) = cj2jm < n "; (3.40)
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where c is a constant, " > 0 is a benchmark for convergence, and n is the number of data items. On the
other hand, 
1  1
2(n  1)
m
=
 
1  1
2(n  1)
2(n 1)! m2(n 1)


1
e
 m
2(n 1)
:
(3.41)
Letm = t 2(n  1), then 
1  1
2(n  1)
m


1
e
t
: (3.42)
As a result, MC-2 converges if we have
c

1
e
t
< n "; (3.43)
which is equivalent to
t > " lnn+ ln c: (3.44)
Therefore, to converge,m need to satisfy the following
m = t 2(n  1) > (" lnn+ ln c) 2(n  1)
= O("n lnn):
(3.45)
Thus, it takes O("n lnn) steps for MC-2 to converge. In other word, the user need to make O("n lnn)
accesses before the access appears to be uniformly at random.
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CHAPTER 4. PROTECTION OF QUERY PRIVACY IN UN-TRUSTED STORAGE
4.1 Introduction
Key-word based query is a primitive function in the scenario of outsourced data storage. Similar to
the access pattern privacy, without proper protection of query privacy, even when data secrecy is per-
fectly protected, an unfaithful storage server can still launch various attacks by observing users’ query
pattern. For example, if the storage server observes that a user has been querying a particular keyword
with a high frequency, it may focus its efforts on attempting to decrypt the matching documents, which
could be of high importance to the user.
Generally, we define query privacy (also known as search pattern in [69]) as the information about
whether two arbitrary queries are performed for the same keyword or not. A formal definition will be
presented later in Section 4.3. In practice, based on the observations on how the user data have been ac-
cessed in the past, such as all prior queries and replies, all prior appearances of the data storage system,
and so on, the storage server could launch various attacks against query privacy. In this work, we focus
on three types of attacks: attacks based on appearances of queries, attacks based on replies to queries,
and attacks based on replies to replayed queries and/or reused database. A few privacy-preserving
query schemes [69–71] have been proposed in the past. However, either they cannot completely ad-
dress all three attacks, or they incur very high overhead. In Section 4.2, we will discuss in detail the
representative solutions on related topics and summarize their limitations with regard to protection of
query privacy.
In this chapter, we propose a novel defense solution, called PQP (Protection of Query Privacy),
which deals with all three attacks at the same time in a light-weight manner. The key innovation of the
proposed PQP scheme lies in its unique query trapdoor design. With PQP, the user builds a secure
searchable keyword index that is also outsourced to the storage server together with its document
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collection. Thus, the query of documents that contain a target keyword becomes a two-step process
in PQP: first search over the keyword index, then search over the document collection. This way,
PQP essentially converts keyword query to a series of location requests. During each stage of the
query process, dummy requests are carefully prepared and mixed with the actual requests to hide the
user’s true intent. Moreover, PQP adopts a hierarchical structure to store the encrypted documents at
the server, which helps reduce the computational, communication and storage overhead of the query
process, thus making PQP a lightweight solution.
4.2 State-of-the-Art Solutions and Their Limitations
4.2.1 Searchable Encryption Schemes
Though the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) technique proposed in [27] can be used to search over en-
crypted data in full generality and with optimal security, it will inevitably incur very high overhead,
which may hinder its deployment in practice. In order to enable efficient search over encrypted data,
many searchable encryption schemes have been proposed [69, 72–75] with weaker privacy guarantees
than in [27]. Song et al: [72] first introduced the problem of searchable encryption in symmetric-
key settings and proposed a solution where each keyword in the file is encrypted independently under
a special two-layered encryption construction. However, it is vulnerable to statistical attacks and its
searching overhead is linear to the size of the database. Goh [73] introduced a notion of secure in-
dexes, which enhances the security performance and reduces the searching overhead to be linear to the
number of matching files only. Many works have also been proposed to enrich the query functionali-
ties [74–76], such as set query and range query. On the other hand, searchable encryption has also been
studied in different settings. For example, Boneh et al: [74] proposed a searchable encryption scheme
in the public-key settings, which allows any user holding the public key to write data and user with the
private key to search. In [77], Chase et al: proposed a scheme that enables searching over encrypted
structured data.
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4.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Search Schemes
Most existing searchable encryption schemes employ encrypted searchable indices with proper
trapdoors to protect the contents of the user’s query. However, the trapdoor used to facilitate the
search may leak privacy about the query. Chang et al: [70] introduced the notion of privacy-preserving
search scheme and proposed a solution to guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak any information
about the queried keywords. However, as pointed out in [69], the definition in [70] can be trivially
satisfied by any searchable encryption scheme. Curtmola et al: [69] investigated the limitations of
the existing searchable encryption schemes and proposed further refined security definitions. A per-
keyword based searchable encryption scheme was also proposed to satisfy the improved security defi-
nitions. In [71], Cao et al: explored some criteria to measure different types of privacy they intended
to protect, including keyword privacy, trapdoor privacy and so on. Furthermore, they proposed vari-
ous privacy-preserving search schemes to meet their privacy protection goals. However, all existing
privacy-preserving schemes are vulnerable to reply and/or replay attacks, which will be explained next.
4.2.3 Limitations of Existing Solutions
In this section, we generally define query privacy as the information about whether two arbitrary
queries are performed for the same keyword or not. A formal definition will be presented later in
Section 4.3. A user’s query privacy is said to be well-protected if, for any two of its queries, it is hard
for the server to determine whether they are performed for the same keywords or not. The server may
attempt to break the user’s query privacy based on its knowledge on how the data storage system has
been accessed in the past, including all prior queries and replies, all prior appearances of the database,
etc.
• Attacks based on appearances of queries. For secure query schemes with deterministic query
trapdoors (such as the ones proposed in [69,71]), the server may easily know whether two queries
are the same by comparing the appearances of the trapdoors directly.
• Attacks based on replies to queries. To deal with the attacks based on appearances of queries,
techniques for generating non-deterministic query trapdoors have been proposed. For example,
in [71], a query vector is camouflaged by techniques such as random scaling. Unfortunately,
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camouflage of a trapdoor is still not sufficient to hide the query privacy. This is because, if two
queries are performed for the same keyword, even though they may be camouflaged and appear
differently, the database will reply with the same outcome (e.g., the number of matching docu-
ments or the storage locations of matching documents). Therefore, by comparing the outcomes
of two queries, the server can easily determine the relation between them.
• Attacks based on replies to replayed queries and/or reused database. To remove the determinis-
tic property from the query outcome, one may utilize database reshuffling techniques (such as the
one used in ORAM [27]) to randomly reshuffle the locations of documents and use re-encryption
to perturb the appearances of documents. As a result, the search outcome of the same query
varies overtime, which makes it difficult for the server to infer the query privacy. However, sim-
ple combination of non-deterministic trapdoor and database reshuffling cannot protect the user’s
query privacy against replay attacks. For example, the server may save an old query as well as
a copy of the original database, and then apply the new query to the original database. The new
query, when applied to the original database, may result in the same set of matching documents
as the old query, which renders database reshuffling ineffective. An even simpler attack is that
the server may replay an old query to the current database and compare the outcome with that of
the current query; if the outcomes are the same, it is very likely that the two queries are the same.
From the above discussions, we can see that, in order to protect the query privacy, the user needs
to update the query trapdoor as well as the database after each query. To the best of our knowledge, all
existing privacy-preserving query schemes have their limitations. Either they are vulnerable to the three
attacks discussed above, or they incur very high communication, computational and storage overheads.
In fact, achieving perfect query privacy and cost efficiency at the same time is very difficult. In this
work, by leveraging the trade-off between security and cost, we propose a solution that aims to provide
fundamental protection towards user’s query privacy against all three attacks yet is light-weight. De-
tailed security and overhead analysis of the proposed scheme will be presented in Section 4.5. Table 4.1
compares the proposed PQP (Protection of Query Privacy) scheme with the representative state-of-the-
art solutions in terms of how well they may deal with the attacks and the efficiency of the solution.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of State-of-the-art Solutions with the Proposed PQP Scheme
Immunity to Attacks Appearance Attacks Reply Attacks Replay Attacks Cost
Chang05 [70] No No No -
Curtmola11 [69] Yes No No -
Cao11 [71] Yes No No -
Schemes in [14, 27, 28, 35] Yes Yes Yes High
Our PQP Scheme Yes Some Yes Low
There have also been proposals of light-weight schemes [78, 79] that aim to protect the access
privacy of the outsourced data. These solutions and the proposed PQP scheme share similar high level
ideas such as hierarchical storage structure and data reshuffling. However, this work aims to address a
different problem, i.e., the privacy protection for keyword-based queries.
4.3 Models and Assumptions
4.3.1 System Model
We consider a basic remote storage system with a storage server and a single user. The user stores
its collection of encrypted documents D on the server, which in turn provides an online interface for
the user to query and retrieve the outsourced data. The user extracts a dictionary of keywordsW from
D and each document contains a certain number of keywords. Later on, when the need for certain
documents arises, the user requests them from the server by sending queries containing the keyword
of user’s interest. In this paper, we focus on the situation where each query contains a single keyword.
How to extend this work to queries of multiple keywords will be discussed in Section 4.4.3. Upon
receiving a query, the server returns the matching documents. After completing the use of the retrieved
documents, the user updates and uploads them back to the server.
4.3.2 Security Assumptions
We assume that the user has a primitive encryption function that generates different cipher-texts
over different input, and the server does not have non-negligible advantage over the user at determining
whether a pair of encrypted documents of the same length represent the same document. As a basic
requirement for hiding privacy information, we also assume that all the documents stored at the server
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have the same size so the server cannot identify a document from its size. In practice, this can be
achieved readily by appending padding bits to short data items or dividing large data items into smaller
ones. We assume that data confidentiality and integrity are protected using other existing techniques
and the communication channel between the user and the server is secured using mechanisms such as
SSL/IPSec. We do not consider denial of service attacks or timing attacks as they can be addressed
independently from this work.
4.3.3 Attack Model
We assume that the server is curious about the user’s private information and may launch various
malicious attacks based on it. Particularly, it is interested in the user’s query privacy, i.e., whether two
arbitrary queries are performed for the same keyword or not. Specifically, the server may try to infer
the user’s query privacy by
• comparing the appearances of two queries;
• comparing the replies to two queries; or
• observing the outcomes of replaying an old query to the current database or applying the current
query to a saved old database.
4.3.4 Design Goal
Let Qti denote the query sent by the user at time ti, and let Dti denote a copy of the outsourced
database at time ti. Let Rti;tj denote the processing results of performing query Qti on database Dtj ,
which include the appearances and the storage locations of the documents in Dtj that match Qti . We
say that the user’s query privacy is fully protected if for any two queries Qtx and Qty (tx 6= ty), we
have
8 ;  2 W;
L(Qtx = ;Qty = 
Qti ;Dti ; Rti;tj ; 8 ti; 8 tj)
= L(Qtx = ;Qty = 
Qti ;Dti ; Rti;tj ; 8 ti; 8 tj);
(4.1)
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where L() is the likelihood function. In other words, for any two queries to the outsourced data,
based on the server’s observations, the target keyword contained in one query could be any one of the
keywords inW with an equal likelihood, regardless of the target keyword contained in the other query.
Our design goal is to develop a light-weight solution to protect the user’s query privacy, while
allowing the user to query and access the outsourced data with low communication, computational and
storage overheads.
4.4 The Proposed PQP Scheme
4.4.1 Scheme Overview
The key innovation of the proposed PQP (Preservation of Query Privacy) scheme lies in its query
trapdoor design as follows. Based on the documents D and the keyword dictionaryW , the user builds
a secure searchable index I, which is also outsourced to the server together with D. Thus, the process
of querying documents that contain a target keyword becomes a two-step procedure: first search over I
and then search over D. PQP essentially converts keyword query to a series of location requests. As a
result, PQP can deal with the reply and replay attacks effectively, with the support from creative usage
of dummy requests and files as follows:
i) Additional dummy index files are queried and additional dummy documents are retrieved to hide
the actual keyword of the user’s query interest.
ii) Dummy index files and dummy documents are selected in such a way to ensure that the user’s
requests in each query have the same format.
iii) The retrieved index files and documents are re-encrypted and re-positioned before being stored
back to the server so as to break the connections between files and their storage locations at the
server.
With (i), the true intent of the user’s query is concealed. With (ii), it becomes impossible for the
server to determine whether two queries are performed for the same keyword or not, because the user’s
requests in each query have exactly the same format regardless of the true intent of the user’s query.
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With (iii), the reply attacks are prevented effectively, as the appearances of documents change after
each query and the storage locations of documents are reshuffled with those of dummies. Moreover,
with (iii), the replay attacks can be prevented as well. This is because, as the mapping between docu-
ments and their storage locations changes after each query, the replay of an old (new) query to a new
(old) database does not return any meaningful information. Details of the proposed PQP scheme are
described next.
4.4.2 Scheme Description
4.4.2.1 System Preparation
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Figure 4.1: System setup. The storage locations of the index files are recorded in a directory file DIR, which
is always stored at a fixed location 0. User’s documents are organized as trimmed B+ tree at the server. Each
internal node records the storage locations of b child nodes. For example, the content of N tf(s;t) is shown in the
callout box, and the b level-(t 1) index files associated withN tf(s;t) are shown as bold boxes in the figure. Here,
f(s; t) =

s
bt

. To obtain documentDs, the user traverses the B+ tree iteratively in a top-down manner to obtain
T internal nodes (marked as gray boxes), one at each level of the tree.
We first explain the system preparation that is needed to execute the proposed PQP scheme. We
study a system where a user stores a collection of documents (denoted byD) with n distinct documents
(denoted by fD1; D2;    ; Dng) at a server. All documents are encrypted with the user’s secret key
before uploading. Before outsourcing the documents to the cloud server, the user abstracts m distinct
keywords of interest from them. Denote the keyword set asW and the keywords as fw1; w2;    ; wmg.
Following the framework of searchable encryption as proposed in [69], the user builds a keyword index
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(denoted as I) in the following way:
• For each keyword w, let x denote the number of documents that contain w. The user records the
IDs of these documents in

x
L

index files, where L is a system parameter. The last of the

x
L

index files is padded to be of size L.
• In PQP, the user retrieves the matching documents of a keyword in rounds. In each round, one of
the

x
L

index files and the corresponding documents are retrieved. To simplify the presentation,
in the rest of the paper, we assume xL 6 1, meaning that each keyword corresponds to a single
index file and all matching documents can be retrieved in one round.
• Each index file is encrypted and uploaded to the server, which returns to the user the index file’s
physical storage location at the server. We use Loc(i) to denote the storage location of I(wi),
i.e., the index file for keyword wi. For simplicity, we assume that Loc(i) ranges from 1 tom, as
shown in Fig. 4.1.
• The user records the storage locations of all index files in a directory file, denoted as DIR, as
shown in Fig. 4.1. Similar to all index files,DIR is also encrypted with the user’s secret key and
uploaded to the server.
• When trying to access an index file I(wi), the user looks up DIR for Loc(i), and then includes
Loc(i) in the request. Upon receiving the request, the server returns the index file stored at
Loc(i).
On the other hand, the user’s document collection is stored and organized in the server as a trimmed
B+ tree in the following way:
• As shown in Fig. 4.1, there is a total of T +1 levels in the tree, where T = dlogb ne and b > 1 is
a system parameter. To simplify the presentation, we assume that logb n is an integer in the rest
of the paper.
• User documents are stored at the leaf level (i.e., level 0) of the tree. Different from a standard B+
tree, potential links from between leaf nodes that may exist in a standard B+ tree are “trimmed”
off.
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• The root node (denoted as NT1 ) and each internal node records the storage locations of b child
nodes. Specifically, node N tj at level t contains the storage locations of the following nodes at
level (t   1): N t 1(j 1)b+1, N t 1(j 1)b+2,    , N t 1jb , as illustrated in the callout box in Fig. 4.1. For
simplicity, in the rest of the paper, by “node” we mean the root node or internal node.
• We assume that nodes at different levels and the documents are stored at non-overlapping storage
spaces.
In each query, PQP also makes use of the access history in the previous query, including: (i) the
keywords (including the dummy keywords) that were queried; (ii) the IDs and the storage locations of
the documents that were accessed; (iii) the IDs and the storage locations of all nodes that were accessed.
These information are stored in cipher-text in a designated storage space at the server. For simplicity,
in the rest of the paper, we assume that the user downloads and decrypts the access history information
when needed and omit the detailed description of these operations.
4.4.2.2 Query Processing
In PQP, to query a particular keyword, four steps are performed: query for the index file, selection
of dummy documents, retrieval of selected documents and post-query updating & uploading, which
will be explained next.
Query for the index file In PQP, when the user intends to query a particular keyword, say wi,
it first requests the corresponding index file I(wi). To conceal the user’s true intent, PQP requires the
user to request a few additional dummy keywords to ensure that the user’s requests in each query have
the same format as follows:
• The total number of keywords queried by the user (including the keyword of user’s interest and
the dummies) remains the same, which is denoted asM (M > 1);
• Out ofM keywords,MA keywords are from the ones requested in the previous query, where
MA = max

1;

M  M
m

: (4.2)
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The other (M MA) keywords are selected from the rest of the keywords. MA remains the same
in each query. This is to ensure that dummy keywords in each query are selected uniformly at
random from the keyword setW .
Note that Eq. (4.2) specifies that MA has a minimum value of one. This requirement is important
in guaranteeing that all queries have the same format since the keyword of user’s interest in the current
query may have also been requested in the previous query. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we
setM = 2 andMA = 1.
To satisfy the above requirement, the user selects the keywords to be requested in the current query
(whose IDs are denoted asWcur) according to the following rules:
• If the keyword of user’s interest (whose ID is denoted asWR) is one of the keywords requested
in the previous query (whose IDs are denoted asWpre), i.e., WR 2 Wpre, the user will include
WR inWcur and select the dummy keyword uniformly at random fromW  Wpre;
• On the other hand, if WR 62 Wpre, the user will include WR in Wcur and select the dummy
keyword uniformly at random fromWpre.
Upon completion of the selection of keywords, the user looks upDIR and sends Loc(Wcur) to the
server, which returns the corresponding index files stored at the specified storage locations. Then, the
user decrypts the index file of the intended keyword and obtains the IDs of the matching documents
(denoted as DI ). After this step, the user updates, re-encrypts, reshuffles all the retrieved index files,
and then uploads them back to the server; details of this operation will be described in Section 4.4.2.2.
In the next two sections, we explain how the user retrieves the matching documents DI using the
document IDs without exposing the query privacy.
Selection of dummy documents To prevent the server from inferring the query privacy via com-
parison of the retrieved documents, PQP requires the user to retrieve a few dummy documents in
addition toDI . Similar to the selection of dummy index files, dummy documents are selected to ensure
that the user’s access to the documents in each query has the same format:
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• The total number of documents retrieved by the user (including the documents of user’s interest
and dummies) remains the same, which is 3L. Recall that L is a system parameter that is used to
limit the size of an index file.
• Out of the 3L documents, 2L are from the ones retrieved in the previous query. The other L
documents are selected from the rest of document collection.
With the addition of dummy documents, the user now always requests 3L documents regardless of
the keyword it is interested in and the actual number of matching documents, which prevents the server
from differentiating between different keywords based on the number of documents requested by the
user. Moveover, PQP requires 2L overlapping documents between two consecutive retrievals; this is
needed to guarantee that the user’s access at each level of the B+ tree during a query has the same
format, hence preserving the query privacy. PQP also requires L non-overlapping documents between
two consecutive retrievals; this is needed asDI could include up to L documents that were not accessed
in the previous query.
In the PQP design, there are two sets of dummy documents to accompany DI :
• DR – reshuffling dummy documents: they may reshuffle storage locations with DI after each
access;
• DN – non-reshuffling dummy documents: they do not reshuffle storage locations with others.
DR and DN are selected according to the following rules:
• Denote the matching documents, the reshuffling dummies and the non-reshuffling dummies in
the previous query as D0I , D0R and D0N respectively. Let C = jDI
TfD0I SD0Rgj. In other
words, C is the number of matching documents that are either the matching documents in
the previous query or the reshuffling dummies in the previous query. Clearly, we have C =
jDI
TfD0I SD0Rgj 6 jDI j 6 L.
• To selectDR: The total number ofDR dummies is jD0I j+ jD0Rj jDI j = 2L jDI j, out of which
(L   C) are selected uniformly at random from the set of matching documents and reshuffling
dummies in the previous query, excluding the matching documents of the current query, i.e.,
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(D0I
S D0R)nDI . The other (L+C   jDI j) are selected uniformly at random from the rest of the
document set, i.e., D n (D0I
SD0RSD0N SDI).
• To select DN : The total number of DN dummies is L. They are selected uniformly at random
from the retrieved documents in the previous query, excluding the matching documents and the
reshuffling dummies in the current query, i.e., (D0I
SD0RSD0N ) n (DI SDR).
Note that the process of selecting dummy documents is independent of the process of selecting
the dummy index file in the first step of query processing. Fig. 4.2 gives an example of how dummy
documents are selected for a particular query.
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Figure 4.2: An example process of selecting the dummy documents, where L = 5. Bold boxes represent the
documents that are accessed in both current and previous queries. In the current query, there are three matching
documents: D2, D4 and D16; thus C = 2. Three reshuffling dummies, i.e., D3, D5 and D7, are randomly
selected from D0I
S D0RnDI . The other four reshuffling dummies (D17, D18, D19 and D20) are randomly
selected from all the documents that are not accessed in the previous query, excluding DI . Non-reshuffling
dummiesD8,D10,D11,D12 andD14 are randomly selected from the retrieved documents in the previous query.
Retrieval of selected documents Upon completion of the selection of dummy documents, the
next step is to retrieve all the selected documents from the server. PQP does so by traversing the B+
tree iteratively in a top-down manner. First, the root node is retrieved and decrypted. Then, 3L nodes
at the next lower level are selected and retrieved, whose storages locations can be found from the
decrypted root node. This process continues till reaching the leaf level. Without loss of generality, the
following describes the operations at level t (i.e., the t-th iteration of the algorithm).
The level-t nodes that store location information for the matching documents (DI ) are first selected
(denoted asN tI ). Note that, the IDs of these files can be found out by using the f(; ) function described
in the caption of Fig. 4.1. Similar to the selection of dummy documents, there are two sets of dummy
nodes to accompany N tI :
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• N tR – reshuffling dummy nodes: they may reshuffle storage locations with N tI after each access;
• N tN – non-reshuffling dummy nodes: they do not reshuffle storage locations with others.
Similarly, dummy nodes are also selected to make sure that 3L level-t nodes are accessed in each
query and exactly 2L of them have also been accessed in the previous query. Note that, if level t has
less than 3L nodes, then all the level-t nodes will be accessed. Specifically, the dummy nodes at level t
are selected according to the following rules:
• Denote the matching nodes, the reshuffling dummy nodes and the non-reshuffling dummy nodes
as N 0tI , N 0tR and N 0tN respectively. Denote the level-t nodes that store location information for
documents DR asN t(DR). Let Ct = j(N tI
SN t(DR))T (N 0tI SN 0tR)j. In other words, Ct is
the number of distinct nodes that store location information for DI and DR in the current query,
but also are the either matching nodes or reshuffling dummy nodes in the previous query. It is
easy to see that 1 6 Ct 6 2L.
• To select N tR: The total number of N tR dummies is 2L   jN tI j. Firstly, the nodes belonging
to N t(DR) but not in N tI are selected as the reshuffling dummy nodes, as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Then, maxfL  Ct; 0g reshuffling dummy nodes are selected uniformly at random from the set
of matching nodes and reshuffling dummies in the previous query, excluding the already selected
nodes, i.e., (N 0tI
S N 0tR n (N tI S N t(DR)). Finally, the rest of reshuffling dummy nodes are
selected uniformly at random from the level-t nodes whose storage locations are contained in
the nodes N t+1I and N t+1R (i.e., the level-(t + 1) matching nodes and reshuffling dummy nodes
accessed in the previous iteration of this algorithm) but have not been accessed in the previous
query.
• To selectN tN : The total number ofN tN dummies is L. Firstly,minf2L Ct; Lg non-reshuffling
dummy nodes are selected uniformly at random from the accessed level-t nodes in the previous
query. Then, the rest of non-reshuffling dummy nodes are selected uniformly at random from the
set of all documents excluding the locations accessed in the previous query.
Fig. 4.3 shows an example of how level-t nodes are selected.
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Figure 4.3: An example process of selecting the dummy nodes at level t of the B+ tree, where L = 5. The
dashed line from a document to a node means that the node stores the location of the document. Bold boxes
represent the nodes that are accessed in both current and previous queries. Grey boxes are the nodes that store
location information for the matching documents and the reshuffling dummy documents in the current query.
Because Ct = 7, three more reshuffling dummy nodesN t16,N
t
17 andN
t
18 are selected randomly from the level-t
nodes whose storage locations are stored in the nodes N t+1I and N t+1R . N t7, N t12 and N t13 are randomly selected
from the level-t nodes accessed in the previous query so that 2L level-t nodes overlap with the previous query.
N t19 and N
t
20 are randomly selected from the level-t nodes that are not accessed in the previous query.
After the level-t nodes have been selected, the storage locations of nodesN tI andN tR can be found
by looking up the retrieved level-(t+1) nodes, namely,N t+1I andN t+1R . Then the storage locations of
the 3L level-t nodes are provided to the server and the files can be downloaded. Note that, the locations
are presented to the server in an arbitrary order, so that the server cannot distinguish between intended
nodes and dummies. The downloaded nodes are then decrypted with the user’s key. At the end of
the t-th iteration, the user updates, re-encrypts, reshuffles the retrieved level-t nodes, and then uploads
them back to the server; the details of this operation is described in Section 4.4.2.2.
Post-query updating and uploading At each step of query processing, after user completes the
usage of retrieved files, including index files, nodes at each level of the B+ tree, and user documents, it
updates, re-encrypts, reshuffles the files and then uploads them back to the server.
The user re-encrypts the retrieved files to ensure that the server cannot identify the files from their
appearances. In PQP, this is done by updating the random nonce that is padded at the head of each file.
For example, the nonce could be associated with the current time stamp to guarantee its uniqueness.
By applying the Cipher Block Chaining encryption techniques [65, 66], cipher-texts of the same file
appear differently for two encryptions with different choices of nonce. As a result, the same secret key
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can be reused for all files, which simplifies the key management at the user.
After re-encryption, the user randomly reshuffles the storage locations of the retrieved files. Specif-
ically, (i) for the two index files, the user swaps their storage locations with a probability of 1/2; (ii)
for level-t nodes on the B+ tree, the user chooses uniformly at random a permutation of the storage
locations of the intended nodes (N tI ) and the reshuffling dummies (N tR). In the special case when
t = 0, level-t nodes are indeed user documents. Then the re-encrypted files are stored back to the
newly arranged locations. Note that the directory file DIR is always uploaded to a fixed location.
4.4.3 Discussions on Multi-Keyword Query
Multi-keyword query is usually needed to increase the query accuracy as well as reduce the com-
munication overhead. One possible way to extend the current PQP scheme to deal with multi-keyword
query is as follows. During system preparation, the user pre-processes the document collection and
generates index files for each potential combination of keywords that the user may query. Then the
query for any conjunctions of multiple keywords can be dealt with in the same way as a single-keyword
query. However, this solution may incur high pre-processing overhead and storage overhead for storing
the index files at the server. Nevertheless, it remains an open problem of how to support multi-keyword
query with privacy preservation and light overhead.
4.5 Performance Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, we will first present the analysis of the security properties of the proposed PQP
scheme. Then we will present the analysis of the incurred overhead.
4.5.1 Security Analysis
4.5.1.1 Dealing with attacks based on appearances of queries
In PQP, the query of documents that contain a target keyword is a two-step process: first search over
the index files and then search over the user documents. PQP essentially converts keyword query to a
series of location requests. This means that the contents of a user query in PQP is indeed the storage
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locations. Therefore, the attacks based on appearances of queries can be addressed as long as we can
deal with the attacks based on replies to queries, which will be discussed in Section 4.5.1.3.
4.5.1.2 Dealing with attacks based on replies to replayed queries and/or reused database
PQP’s two-step query design makes it straightforward to deal with attacks based on replies to re-
played queries and/or reused database. This is because, in PQP, the contents of a query are storage
locations, and the mapping between the accessed files and their storage locations changes after each
query. Therefore, the replay of an old (new) query to a new (old) database does not return any mean-
ingful information.
4.5.1.3 Dealing with attacks based on replies to queries
In PQP, there are three types of replies from the server during the three stages of query processing:
the index files, the nodes of the B+ tree and the user documents. For each type, as the files all have the
same size and they are re-encrypted after being accessed, the appearance of the files does not leak any
extra information other than the files’ locations. Next, we show how PQP deals with privacy attacks
based on the locations of the index files accessed at the beginning of query processing.
Theorem 3. Given any two consecutive queries, the server cannot infer any relation between their
target index files by observing the storage locations that have been accessed.
Proof. Let f1 and f2 denote the two index files accessed in the first of the two consecutive queries, and
let `1 and `2 denote their physical storage locations. Let `a and `b denote the locations accessed in the
second query.
According to the PQP protocol described in the previous section, out of the two keywords requested
in the second query, exactly one of them was requested in the first query. Therefore, the server observes
that one and only one of the two locations accessed in the second query also appeared in the first query.
Without loss of generality, let `a = `1; hence `b 6= `2. Then, the likelihood function that the target file
in the second query is f1 can be calculated as follows:
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L(target file in the second query is f1j`a = `1; `b 6= `2)
= P (`a = `1; `b 6= `2j target is f1)
= P (f1 is at location `1 during the second query)
 P (dummy is randomly selected from the rest (n  2) files)
= P (no location swap of f1 and f2 after the first query)
 P (dummy is randomly selected from the rest (n  2) files)
=
1
2
 1
n  2 :
(4.3)
Similarly, we can also calculate the likelihood function that the target file in the second query is f2,
which is 12  1n 2 .
Now, consider the likelihood function that the target file in the second query is fi where i =
3;    ; n. As the server knows that f1 and f2 still occupy locations `1 and `2 regardless whether they
swapped the locations after the first query, fi can only be at one of the rest (n  2) locations other than
`1 and `2. Therefore, we have
L(target file in the second query is fij`a = `1; `b 6= `2)
= P (`a = `1; `b 6= `2j target is fi)
= P (fi is at location `b)
 P (dummy is randomly selected from ff1; f2g)
= P (fi is at location `b)
 (P (dummy is f1)  P (no location swap of f1 and f2)
+P (dummy is f2)  P (f1 and f2 swapped locations))
=
1
n  2 

1
2
 1
2
+
1
2
 1
2

=
1
2
 1
n  2 :
(4.4)
It is interesting to see that, if only based on the server’s observation of the storage locations that
have been accessed in two consecutive queries, the target file in the second query could be any one of
75
the n files with an equal likelihood. This means that the best the server can do to infer the relation
between the target files in these two queries is a random guess. Hence, the query privacy is fully
protected. 
Theorem 4. Given any two consecutive queries, the server cannot infer any relation between their
target nodes at level t of the B+ tree, by observing the storage locations that have been accessed.
Theorem 5. Given any two consecutive queries, the server cannot infer any relation between their
target documents by observing the storage locations that have been accessed.
Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 are similar to that of Theorem 3 thus are omitted here.
Discussion of query privacy protection for any two queries: Though the proposed PQP scheme
ensures perfect privacy for any two consecutive queries, it does not provide perfect privacy for two
queries that are not consecutive. Fig. 4.4 illustrates the issue with an example of three consecutive
queries of index files. Let f1 and f2 denote the two index files accessed in the first query and their
storage locations are the first and second shaded boxes of Q1, respectively. Let A denote the access
sequence of storage locations. Then, it is easy to calculate that
L(target file in Q3 is f1jA) = 1
8
 1
(n  2)2 ; (4.5)
L(target file in Q3 is f2jA) = 1
8
 1
(n  2)2 ; (4.6)
and for i > 3,
L(target file in Q3 is fijA)  1
2
 1
(n  2)2 : (4.7)
By comparing the likelihood values, the server is able to infer that it is more likely that the first query
and the third query target at different keywords, although it may not be able to claim this definitely. In
other words, PQP provides partial protection to the query privacy in this case. In fact, due to random
swapping and overlapping of locations between consecutive queries, PQP provides partial protection
to the query privacy for any two non-consecutive queries. In general, it is very difficult to provide full
protection to the query privacy for non-consecutive queries while keeping the incurred overheads low.
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Q1
Q2
Q3
Figure 4.4: An example of three consecutive queries, where each shaded box represents a storage location
accessed in a query.
This is part of our future work, and one possible idea is to introduce dummy queries between actual
queries.
4.5.2 Overhead Analysis
4.5.2.1 Communication and Computational Overhead
In this section, we use m0 to denote the number of index files stored at the server. As explained
in Section 4.4, in PQP, in order to query a keyword that is contained in x files, it takes the cloud user
x
L

rounds to retrieve all the matching documents, where L is the system parameter that decides the
maximum number of documents in an index file. In each round, the cloud user needs to obtain the
following information from the cloud server:
• One DIR file which records the storage locations ofm0 index files; it takes logm0 bits to repre-
sent a storage location; hence the size of DIR ism0 logm0 bits.
• The access history of the two index files that were accessed in the previous query; hence, it
contains two fields and each field is logm0-bit long.
• The intended index file and a dummy index file; each index file records the IDs of at most L
documents, each of which takes log n bits; hence the size of each index file is L log n bits.
• 3L nodes at each level of the B+ tree; each node records the storage locations of b index files at
its next lower level and it takes at most log n bits to represent a storage location; hence the size
of each node is b log n bits.
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• The access history of each level of the B+ tree structure (including the leaf level but excluding the
root level); each access history records the IDs and storage locations of 3L nodes (at this level)
that were accessed in the previous query; hence, it contains 6L fields and each field is log n-bit
long.
• 3L documents with L matching documents and 2L dummy documents; we use  to denote the
size of each document in bits.
Recall that there is a total of logb n levels in the B+ tree storage structure. Therefore, the overall
communication and computational overhead for one round can be calculated as:
OHc&c = m0 logm0 + 2 logm0 + 2L logn
+ logb n  3L  b logn+ logb n  6L  logn+ 3L:
(4.8)
Hence, the overall communication and computational overhead for querying a keyword with x match-
ing documents is: lx
L
m
 OHc&c (4.9)
Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9) show that the communication and computational overhead for querying a keyword
depends on the choice ofL and b. We will discuss how to choose a proper value forL in Section 4.5.2.3.
Clearly, for fixedm0, n and L, OHc&c depends on the choice of b. Let S1 = m0 logm0+2 logm0+
2L log n+3L , which is independent of the choice of b. It is easy to verify the upper and lower bounds
for OHc&c: 8<: minOHc&c = OHc&cjb=4 = 9L(logn)2 + S1;maxOHc&c = OHc&cjb=n = (3n+ 6)L logn+ S1: (4.10)
4.5.2.2 Storage Overhead
In PQP, the total number of nodes in the B+ tree structure is:
n  1
b  1 = 1 + b+ b
2 + b3 +   + bT : (4.11)
Recall that the server also stores a directory file DIR, the access histories for index files, nodes
and documents, m0 index files and n documents. Therefore, the overall storage overhead at the cloud
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server can be calculated as:
OHs server = m0 logm0 + 2 logm0 +m0  L logn
+
n  1
b  1  b logn+ logb n  6L  logn+ n:
(4.12)
Similarly, let S2 = m0 logm0 + 2 logm0 +m0  L log n+ n , which is independent of the choice of b.
It is easy to verify that:
8>>>><>>>>:
minOHs server = OHs serverjb=n
= n logn+ 6L  logn+ S2;
maxOHs server = OHs serverjb=2
= 2(n  1)  logn+ 6L  (logn)2 + S2:
(4.13)
From the above analysis, we can see that there is a trade-off between the communication and computa-
tional overhead and the storage overhead at the server depending on the choice of b. On the other hand,
Eq. (4.13) indicates we can see that the maximum and minimum values of the server storage overhead
are both in the order of n log n. Therefore, we recommend to use a small b value (e.g., b = 4) in PQP,
which yields a low communication and computational overhead and a reasonably low server storage
overhead.
At the user side, at any given time, the cloud user may need to store one of following information:
(i) one DIR file, or (ii) two index files and one access history for index files/nodes/documents and 3L
nodes/documents. Therefore, the required temporary storage at the user side is:
OHs user = maxfm0 logm0; 2L  logn+
6L maxflogm0; logng+maxf3L  b logn; 3Lgg
(4.14)
4.5.2.3 Overhead Discussion
Next, we discuss how to choose a proper value for L. By setting b = 4, the overall communication
and computational overhead per retrieved document now becomes
O
l x
L
m L
x
 (logn)2

+O
l x
L
m 1
x
m0(logm0)

+O
l x
L
m L
x


: (4.15)
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In the convenience for overhead comparison with previous ORAMs in Section 4.5.2.4, we rewrite the
above equation using file as a unit, which is
O
l x
L
m L
x
 logn

+O
l x
L
m 1
x
m0

: (4.16)
Recall thatm0 is the total number of index files, which can be calculated as
Pm
i=1dxi=Le.
If L is set too large, e.g., L = n, where n is the number of total documents, we have m0 =Pm
i=1dxi=Le = m. As m 6 n, the communication and computational overhead per retrieved docu-
ment in Eq. (4.16) is now in the order of
O(n log n): (4.17)
If L is set too small, e.g., L = 1, we have m0 =
Pm
i=1dxi=Le =
Pm
i=1 xi  c1  n, where c1 is a
constant. Then, the communication and computational overhead per retrieved document in Eq. (4.16)
is in the order of
O(n): (4.18)
On the other hand, if L is set to be around x, which is the expected number of matching documents
over all keywords, we havem0 =
Pm
i=1dxi=Le =
Pm
i=1dxi=xe  c2 m, where c2 is a constant. Then,
the expected communication and computational overhead per retrieved document in Eq. (4.16) is in the
order of
O(log n) +O(m): (4.19)
It is easy to see that the overhead in Eq. (4.19) is lower than that in Eq. (4.17) or Eq. (4.18). Recall
that L also affects the delay of the query. Specifically, it takes

x
L

rounds to retrieve all x matching
documents. Consider all these factors together, we recommend the user to set L to be around or slightly
larger than x.
4.5.2.4 Overhead Comparison
Though it has been mentioned [69] that Oblivious RAMs (ORAMs) can be used to search over
encrypted data with optimal security, we are not aware of any existing schemes that actually implement
a privacy-preserving query scheme based on ORAM. Nevertheless, we compare the overhead of PQP
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with a state-of-the-art ORAM algorithm [35] to show the efficiency of PQP.
When b is set to 4 and L is chosen to be around the expected number of matching documents over
all keywords, the per-retrieved-document communication and computational overhead incurred by PQP
is O(log n) + O(m). It can be further reduced to O(log n) + O(logm) by applying a similar B+ tree
structure to maintain the index files at the cloud server, which can reduce the overhead incurred by the
DIR file from the order of O(m) to O(logm). On the other hand, according to [35], the worst-case
communication and computational overhead of ORAM to retrieve a document is O( (logn)
2
log logn). As a
result, PQP is more efficient than ORAM in terms of the communication and computational overhead.
Moreover, PQP consumes similar storage space at the server side as ORAMs do but requires less
temporary storage space at the user side, which is more desirable for the emerging cloud computing
applications where users only have thin client devices.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present a light-weight solution called PQP (Protection of Query Privacy) to
protect a user’s query privacy from an un-trusted storage of its outsourced data. We study three types
of attacks that the server may launch against the user: attacks based on appearances of queries, attacks
based on replies to queries, and attacks based on replies to replayed queries and/or reused database.
Security analysis shows that PQP can deal with all three attacks effectively. We also provide detailed
overhead analysis to justify the lightweight-ness of the proposed scheme.
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CHAPTER 5. ACCESS PRIVACYWITH USER ACCOUNTABILITY IN
UN-TRUSTED STORAGE
5.1 Introduction
Existing ORAM designs share a common problem which may limit their practical applications.
Specifically, these designs all assume that the outsourced data is accessible to trusted users only and
hence they are not equipped with any protection against attacks towards data integrity from malicious
users. Unfortunately, such an assumption may not hold in practice. For example, a company may
export its financial records to a cloud storage; while it may want to share the financial data with its
stake holders, it is critical to protect the integrity of the data and hold a malicious user accountable
if data is altered. Therefore, it is highly desirable to introduce accountability support into ORAM.
However, existing accountability solutions cannot be readily applied because of the conflicting goals
of ORAM and existing accountability solutions: preserving access pattern privacy in ORAM requires
data blocks to be frequently re-encrypted and re-positioned, which can easily conceal the traces that
are needed for detecting misbehavior and identifying attackers.
In this chapter, we propose an accountability solution for hash-basd ORAM such as [27]. Our
scheme can detect misconduct by malicious users and identify the attackers, while not interfering with
the access pattern preservation mechanisms inherent from the underlying ORAM. This goal is achieved
via a creative integration of Merkle hash tree [80] and group signature [81–83] techniques, as well as
a delicate design of the data block format. With our scheme, selected traces of accesses are properly
recorded for the purpose of attack detection but without revealing the private information of innocent
users that shall be kept confidential to protect their access pattern privacy. We have conducted both
security analysis and overhead evaluation for the proposed scheme. Results show that our scheme has
achieved the design goals of providing accountability support to ORAM and preservation of data access
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pattern privacy, at the cost of slightly increased storage, communication, and computational overheads.
5.2 System Model and Design Goals
In this chapter, we study a system where an owner of a dataset outsources the data to a remote
server and shares the dataset with a group of users. Based on the access control requirement of the
application, the owner may authorize different users with different access privileges. For each data
item, we consider three types of access privileges: no access, read-only access, and write access.
Moreover, in order to prevent leakage of access pattern privacy, the owner is assumed to follow a
hash-based Oblivious RAM (ORAM) design to deploy the data on the server.
We assume the dataset owner is trusted while the server is honest but curious in learning users’
access patterns. On the other hand, users could be misbehaving. Specifically, a user may attempt to
attack the data integrity via un-authorized modification, replacement, addition, or deletion. However,
we assume the user will not attack the underlying ORAM, for its own benefits of access pattern protec-
tion. We assume a user’s personal identifiable information such as IP address is anonymized by other
existing techniques (such as onion routing). The design goals of the proposed scheme are: (i) preserv-
ing users’ access patterns of the dataset, including both the overall access pattern of the dataset and a
single user’s or a group of users’ access pattern; and (ii) detecting attacks launched by a malicious user
towards data integrity, and upon detection, enabling the dataset owner to identify the user who made
the modification.
5.3 Proposed Scheme
Our scheme is designed to be integrated with most hash-based ORAM schemes [14, 27, 33–36].
Please refer to [14, 27, 33–36] for details of the ORAM operations. In this dissertation, we explain
how our scheme works with the seminal hash-based ORAM scheme proposed by O. Goldreich and R.
Ostrovsky [27], which provides a framework for all other hash-based ORAMs. Our scheme is based on
integration of two well-known techniques: (i) Merkle hash tree [80] which allows efficient verification
of the integrity of a large set of data, and (ii) group signature [81] which allows each member of a
group to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group. Please refer to [80, 81] for details of
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these techniques. In the following, we first present the intuitions of the proposed scheme, and then
explain the details of the design.
5.3.1 Scheme Overview: The Intuitions
Built on top of a hash-based ORAM such as [27], our proposed scheme has the ultimate goal of
user accountability and data access pattern preservation, which is attained through accomplishing each
of the following more specific subgoals:
(G1) If the content of a data block is modified by an un-authorized user, the misconduct shall be
detected and the attacker shall be identified.
(G2) During a query or shuffling process, the set of data blocks that a user uploads to the server shall
be the same as the set downloaded earlier. If a user fails to do so, the misconduct shall be detected
and the user shall be identified.
(G3) When being uploaded, data blocks shall be placed properly to the buckets decided by the under-
lying ORAM; that is, the position of each data block shall be determined by a designated hash
function. If a user fails to do so, the misconduct shall be detected and the user shall be identified.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G1) In our scheme, subgoal (G1) is accomplished via group signatures.
Initially, when exporting a data block to the server, the data owner generates two group signatures: s
– a group signature for the entire data block (on behalf of all the users in the system), and g – a group
signature for the content and ID of the data block only (on behalf of the users who have the write
privilege to the data block). When a user accesses a data block, it verifies both signatures. If s is valid
but g is invalid, it is detected that the user who last accessed the data block has modified the data block
without proper authorization, and the identity of the attacking user can be traced out by the data owner
based on the group signature s. If both signatures are valid, the user proceeds to access the data and
generates a new group signature s before uploading the data block back to the serve. Note that, if the
user has the write privilege and has modified the data content, it also needs to generate a new group
signature g for the updated data content. At the server side, after it receives a data block from the user,
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it simply checks the group signature s. If it is invalid, the uploading user is detected to have committed
a misconduct.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G2) During a query or shuffling process, data blocks are re-encrypted
and re-arranged. Therefore, it is challenging to ensure that the user always uploads the same set of data
blocks that it downloaded from the server. In our scheme, this is accomplished via group signatures
and Merkle hash tree. Specifically, after a user requests and downloads a set of data blocks, the server
constructs a Merkle hash tree using the hash values of the IDs of the requested blocks as leaf nodes,
and calculates the root hash of the tree. Then, the server informs the user of the root hash as well as the
co-path information in the Merkle hash tree for each block. After access to the data, the user updates
the following information in each data block before uploading it back to the server: c – hash of the
block ID with a new random nonce, e – root hash of the Merkle hash tree (informed by the server), and
e0 – an encryption of the co-path information (also informed by the server) with a new random nonce.
Recall that the data content and block ID are protected by the group signature g.
This way, if a user fails to upload the same set of data blocks back to the server, such misconduct
can be detected by the server or the user who next accesses the data block. For example, if a user
replaces the content of a data block with that of another data block, together with block ID, or co-path
information, or root hash, or a combination (but not all) of them, this can be detected by the user who
next accesses the data block, since the root hash carried in the data block would be different from the
one calculated using the block ID and co-path information. However, if the user replaces the entire data
block, this can be detected by the server, since either the root hash of the data block is different from
all other uploaded blocks, or the encrypted co-path information of the data block is identical to another
uploaded block. Also note that the server cannot identify a data block using the hash of the block ID or
the co-path information, because both hash and encryption operations use a new random nonce.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G3) With the above solutions to subgoals (G1) and (G2) in place, the
solution to subgoal (G3) becomes straightforward as follows. To ensure that a data block is placed
properly according to the underlying ORAM, our scheme requires the user to include the position
information (i.e., layer and bucket) as part of the block before generating the group signature s. Next
time when another user accesses the block, it checks whether the block was placed at the position
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specified in the data block, and whether the position is consistent with the output of the hash function
designated by the underlying ORAM.
Next, we elaborate the details of the our scheme which integrates the above solutions to subgoals
(G1)-(G3).
5.3.2 System Initialization
System initialization is conducted by the owner of the dataset. It consists of four operations: se-
lection of system parameters, user authorization, preparation of data blocks, and uploading of data
blocks to the storage server. In the following, we describe these operations in detail. Particularly, when
describing how to prepare and upload data blocks, the data format and storage structure will also be
introduced.
5.3.2.1 Selection of System Parameters
Let n be the total number of data blocks exported to the storage server; for simplicity, n is assumed
to be a power of 2. We also assume that each exported data block has a unique ID i which is an integer
belonging to set f1;    ; ng. Let U , Ui;R, and Ui;W denote the set of all users in the system, the set of
users who are authorized to read data block i, and the set of users who are authorized to read and write
data block i, respectively. Therefore, we have U  Ui;R  Ui;W . For each data block i, the dataset
owner selects the following parameters:
• ki: a symmetric key that is used to encrypt the plain-text content of data block i. It is known to
all users in Ui;R.
• K+i , fK i;ugu2Ui;W : one group public key (K+i ) and a set of group private keys (fK i;ugu2Ui;W ),
where K i;u denotes the private key assigned to user u 2 Ui;W . We use Gi-Sigu() to denote the
group signature generated by user u in this group.
Note that if a data block j has the same access control policy as data block i (i.e., Uj;R = Ui;R and Uj;W
= Ui;W ), the owner sets kj = ki, K+j = K+i , and K j;u = K i;u for any u 2 Ui=j;W . In addition, the
dataset owner also selects the following system parameters:
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• k: a system symmetric key for general encryption purposes. It is known to all users in U .
• K+0 , fK 0;ugu2U : one group public key (K+0 ) and a set of group private keys (fK 0;ugu2U ), where
K 0;u denotes the private key that is assigned to user u 2 U . We use G0-Sigu() to denote the
group signature generated by user u in this group.
• hl(x; y) for l = 1;    ; log n: a set of hash functions, where each hl(x; y) hashes a pair of
positive integers x and y 2 f1;    ; ng to an integer in f1;    ; 2lg. They are known to all users
in U .
• H(x): a hash function that randomly maps one or a sequence of integers to an L-bit integer,
where L is a security parameter.
• E(): a deterministic symmetric encryption algorithm where  is the encryption key and  is
the plain-text to be encrypted. We also useE(; ) to denote the encryption of the concatenation
of  and  with key .
Table 5.1: Distribution of keys to the server and users.
k K+0 K
 
0;u ki K
+
i K
 
i;u
server
p
u 2 U p p p p
u 2 Ui;R p p p p p
u 2 Ui;W p p p p p p
5.3.2.2 User Authorization
Among the parameters, K+0 and hash function H(x) are available to the public. For each user
u 2 U , the owner provides the symmetric key k, a distinct group private keyK 0;u, and the set of group
public keysK+i (i = 1;    ; n). In addition, if a user u is authorized to read data block i, i.e., u 2 Ui;R,
the owner provides the symmetric key ki to the user; if a user u is authorized to write data block i, i.e.,
u 2 Ui;W , the owner provides ki and a distinct group private keyK i;u to the user. Table 5.1 summarizes
how the keys are distributed to the server and users.
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5.3.2.3 Preparation of Data Blocks
We use i to denote the ID of a data block and use Di;t to denote the data block associated with
ID i and time stamp t. The plain-text content carried in Di;t is denoted as wi;v, where v denotes the
version number of the data content and is incremented when the content is updated. To enforce the
access control policy, wi;v is encrypted together with its ID i by its corresponding encryption key ki.
We use di;v to denote the encrypted data content in Di;t, i.e.,
di;v = Eki(ri;v; i; wi;v): (5.1)
where ri;v is a random nonce chosen upon each encryption of wi;v. More specifically, a data blockDi;t
has the following format:
Di;t = hd0i;t; ci;t; ei;t 1; e0i;t 1; li;t; bi;t; si;ti; (5.2)
where the fields are explained below. A high-level explanation of the purpose of each data field is
shown in Fig. 5.1, while detailed explanations about how these data fields are used will be presented in
Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.4.
( )( ), , , , 1 , , , ,, , , , , , ,ii t k i t i v i v i v k i v i v i vd E r r i d E r i w gµ −′ =           =      
( ), , ,, ,i t i t i vc H i rµ=       
, 1i te −    
( ), 1 , 1 , 1,i t k i t i te E µ− − −′ =          S
(V3) ID hash
verification
(V4) root hash verification:
prevents replacement attacks,i t
s    
,i tl  
(V5) placement verification
(V1) protects integrity of 
the block and provides 
access accountability
(V2) protects integrity of data content 
and provides writing accountability
,i tb  
Figure 5.1: A high-level explanation of the purpose of each data field in the data block. (V1)-(V5) along
the dashed lines indicate the verification steps that are performed by a user, which will be explained
later in Section 5.3.3.
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• d0i;t is a one-time encryption of the concatenation of the following items: (i) the block ID i,
(ii) the encrypted data content di;v, (iii) the random nonce ri;v that is encrypted in di;v, (iv) the
random nonce ri;v 1 that was encrypted in di;v 1, i.e., the previous version of the data content,
and (v) a group signature gi;v generated by the owner or a user who has the privilege to write this
block, i.e.,
gi;v = Gi-Sigu(i; di;v; ri;v; ri;v 1): (5.3)
Thus, d0i;t has the following format:
d0i;t = Ek(i;t; ri;v; ri;v 1; i; di;v; gi;v); (5.4)
where that i;t is a random nonce different from ri;v in Eq. (5.1) and Eq. (5.3). i;t can be updated
by any user who possesses k and its main purpose is to change the appearance of the encrypted
data after each access. In comparison, ri;v can only be updated by a user who is authorized to
write the data block and its main purpose is to prevent replacement attacks launched by malicious
users.
The purpose of the group signature gi;v is to protect the integrity of d0i;t, so that only a user who
is authorized to write the data block (and hence owns the group private keyK i;u) can update ri;v,
ri;v 1, and di;v legitimately. Meanwhile, it also enables the data owner to track the identity of
the user who made the last modification.
• ci;t is a one-time hash of the block ID i, together with random nonces i;t and ri;v:
ci;t = H(i;t; i; ri;v): (5.5)
During each query or reshuffling process, ci;t is used by the server to build a Merkle hash tree
based on the data blocks requested.
• ei;t 1 is the root hash of the Merkle hash tree that was constructed when Di;t was last accessed
(for simplicity, we use t   1 to denote the time stamp when Di;t was last accessed). The leaf
nodes of the Merkle hash tree are the ID hashes of all the blocks downloaded together with Di;t
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during its previous access. The purpose of ei;t 1 (together with e0i;t 1 which is explained below)
is to let the user and the server collaboratively verify that, when a data block was previously
accessed, the set of data blocks uploaded back to the server after the access was the same as the
set downloaded.
• e0i;t 1 is a one-time encryption of the hash tree information that is needed to calculate the root
hash ei;t 1. Specifically,
e0i;t 1 = Ek(i;t 1; Si;t 1); (5.6)
where St 1;i denotes the co-path hash values for leaf hash ci;t 1 when the data block was re-
trieved at time t  1.
• li;t and bi;t: the layer and bucket of block Di;t in the storage hierarchy.
• si;t is a group signature of the entire block generated by the owner or any user in the system:
si;t = G0-Sigu(d0i;t; ci;t; ei;t 1; e
0
i;t 1; li;t; bi;t): (5.7)
Similar to gi;v, the purpose of si;t is to allow the server and users to verify the integrity of the
entire data block, as well as to enable the owner to track the identity of the user who last accessed
the data block.
• Initially, the time stamp t and the version number v are set to 0, both ei; 1 and e0i; 1 are set to
empty, li;t is initialized to logn, and bi;t is initialized to hlogn(0; i).
5.3.2.4 Uploading of Data Blocks to the Storage Server
All the data blocks are stored to a hierarchy of layers according the underlying ORAM. Specifically,
the hierarchy consists of logn layers. Each layer l (1 6 l 6 log n) includes 2l buckets and each
bucket contains log n blocks. Hence, the server stores (2n 2) log n data blocks in total, which includes
n real data blocks that contain meaningful data exported by the owner. The other (2n   2) log n   n
data blocks in the hierarchy are called dummy data blocks. They simply contain random stuffing data
and no user (except the owner) is authorized to write a dummy block. To create a dummy data block,
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the owner randomly generates a unique block ID and some data content, and then creates the data block
in the same format as the real data block. Each dummy data block Dj;t is initialized with t set to 0,
ej; 1 and e0j; 1 set to empty, and lj;t and bj;t set to some layer and bucket so that dummy data blocks
fill up all the storage locations not occupied by the real data blocks. In addition, the server maintains
a counter Cq (with an initial value of 0) which keeps track of the number of queries that have been
processed.
5.3.3 Query Process
To retrieve a target data block with ID T , a user performs the following operations.
(Q1) Both buckets at the top layer of the storage hierarchy are retrieved from the server. If the target
data block is found in the buckets, the flag found is set to true; else, it is set to false.
(Q2) Counter Cq is retrieved from the server, and letm = Cq + 1.
(Q3) For each layer i from 2 to log n, the following is performed:
• If found = true, a bucket is selected uniformly at random from the layer and all the data
blocks in the bucket are retrieved.
• If found = false, all data blocks in bucket hi(bm=2ic; T ) are retrieved. If target block
is found among the retrieved blocks, found is set to true.
(Q4) After all the requested data blocks have been retrieved, the server constructs a Merkle hash tree
based on the data ID hashes (i.e., ci;ti) of the retrieved blocks, calculates the root hash (i.e., ei;t)
of the tree, and saves it for future verification purposes. Then, the server notifies the user of the
root hash and the co-path hash values (i.e., Si;ti) for each retrieved data block Di;ti .
(Q5) The user verifies all the retrieved data blocks, accesses the content of the target data block, re-
formats all the retrieved data blocks, and then uploads them back to the server. More specifically,
this step involves the operations of verification, updating, and uploading, as explained below.
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5.3.3.1 Verification
Each retrieved data block Di;ti is verified as follows.
(V1) Verification of group signature si;ti: si;ti is verified with the public keyK
+
0 .
(V2) Verification of group signature gi;vi: gi;vi is verified with the group public keyK
+
i . If it is invalid,
a user misconduct has been detected, as the user who last accessed the block must have altered
the data content without proper authorization.
(V3) Verification of ID hash ci;ti: The correctness of ci;ti is verified by checking whether it is equal
to H(i;ti ; i; ri;vi). Note that, i;ti ,i, and ri;vi are parts of d
0
i;ti
and hence protected by the group
signature gi;vi . If ci;ti is incorrect, a user misconduct has been detected.
(V4) Verification of root hash ei;ti 1: Recall that ei;ti 1 is the root hash of the Merkle hash tree
constructed by the server when the data block was last accessed. To verify it, the user needs the
following information: the ID hash ci;ti 1 and the co-path hashes Si;ti 1 when the data block
was last accessed. As we will explain in the “Updating” operation below, if the last access to the
data block was a write access, a new random nonce rvi would be generated. Therefore, as the
user is unsure about the last access, it verifies ei;ti 1 against both rvi and rvi 1. In other words, it
checks whether ei;ti 1 is same as the root hash calculated based on using eitherH(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi)
or H(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi 1) as the ID hash ci;ti 1, and the co-path hashes Si;ti 1. If both fail, a user
misconduct has been detected. Note that ri;vi and ri;vi 1 can be obtained from d0i;ti , while i;ti 1
and Si;ti 1 can be obtained from e0i;ti 1.
(V5) Verification of data block placement: Suppose Di;ti is retrieved from bucket b of layer l (l > 1).
It is checked whether li;ti = l and bi;ti = b. Also, if the block is not a dummy, it is verified
whether b = hl(bm=2lc; i). If verification fails, a misplacement attack has been detected.
5.3.3.2 Updating
After all the verifications have succeeded and the target data has been accessed, the user updates
the retrieved data blocks as follows.
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• For each block i, a new random nonce i;new is selected. The user sets ti = ti + 1 and i;ti =
i;new. In addition, if a data block is the target block and the current access is a write access, a
new random nonce ri;new is selected and ri;vi = ri;new.
• Then, for each block, the user calculates d0, c, and e0 with the updated parameters and random
nonces, and sets e to the root hash notified by the server.
• Next, according to the underlying ORAM, a dummy block is randomly picked from the top layer
of the storage hierarchy, and the target block swaps its position with the dummy by swapping the
values of their b and l fields. For all other blocks, b and l fields remain unchanged.
• Finally, a new group signature s is generated for each updated data block.
5.3.3.3 Uploading
After all the retrieved data blocks have been updated, they are uploaded back to the server at the
positions determined by their b and l values. The order in which the blocks are uploaded is arbitrary. In
addition, if the counter Cq is a multiple of 2l for certain l 2 f1;    ; log ng but not a multiple for any
2l
0
where l0 > l, a shuffling process for layer l should be conducted by this user. The shuffling process
is elaborated in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.3.4 Server Operations
Upon receiving an uploaded data block, the server performs the following verifications. If any of
them fails, a user misconduct has been detected and the server refuses to accept the block.
(O1) Verify the validity of the group signature s;
(O2) Verify that the root hash e carried in the block is the same as the root hash of the Merkle hash
tree constructed by the server during Step (Q4);
(O3) Verify that the e0 value carried in the block is different from all other uploaded blocks. This is to
prevent replacement attacks launched by the user.
(O4) Increase the counter Cq by one.
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5.3.4 Shuffling Process
The shuffling process for layer l is to obliviously re-position and re-format all the blocks residing
at layers 1,    , l so that: (i) after the shuffling, each bucket contains the same number (i.e., log n) of
blocks; (ii) each real data block Di;ti is placed to bucket hl(
Cq
2i
; i) of layer l, where Cq is the afore-
mentioned counter keeping track of the number of queries that have been processed. Incorporating
accountability mechanisms, the detailed operations are as follows. An example where l = 2 is shown
in Fig. 5.2.
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Buffer
3,
D1
1,
D2
0,
~
3,
D4
4,
D3
1,
~
2,
~
3,
~
4,
~
log n log nlog nlog n
~
~
~
~
~
~
Layer 1 Layer 2~ ~ ~
D1
D4
D2
D3
(S5)-(S6) Obliviously sort the buffer, put each data block to its bucket.
Figure 5.2: Example of the shuffling process. Each bucket has log n data blocks. We use the symbol 
to represent one or more adjacent dummy data blocks.
(S1) The server merges all the data blocks at layers 1;    ; l to a shuffling buffer, builds a Merkle hash
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tree with the data ID hash fields of these blocks as leaf nodes, and calculates the root hash. Then,
for each block Di;ti in the buffer, the root hash value ei;ti and its corresponding co-path values
Si;ti are attached to the block. After this, the following five steps are performed by the user who
conducts the shuffling process.
(S2) In this step, the user scans (i.e., downloads, processes, and re-uploads back) the blocks in the
shuffling buffer, one by one. More specifically, after a block Di;ti has been downloaded, the
validity of the data block, including the attached ei;ti and Si;ti , is first checked in a similar manner
as in the verification process during a regular query (please refer to Section 5.3.3). If the check
fails, the user stops the shuffling process and informs the owner of the potential tampering of the
data block. Otherwise, the block is further processed as follows to obtain a new block of different
appearance: (i) A new nonce i;new is picked uniformly at random. (ii) d0i is re-computed as
Ek(i;new; ri;vi ; ri;vi 1; i; di;vi ; gi;vi) and ci is re-computed as H(i;new; i; ri;vi). (iii) The root
hash value is replaced with ei;ti . (iv) e
0
i is computed as Ek(i;ti ; Si;ti). (v) A tag Ti is assigned
to indicate which bucket the block should reside after the shuffling. Particularly, if the block is
a real data block of ID i, Ti = hl(Cq=2l; i); otherwise (i.e., the block is a dummy block), Ti is
picked from f0;    ; 2ig such that, after the assignment has been performed for all the dummy
blocks in the buffer, log n dummy blocks are assigned with tag j for each j = 1;    ; 2i while the
rest dummy blocks are assigned with tag 0. (vi) Tag Ti is encrypted and saved in field bi; that is,
bi;new = Ek(ri;ti+1; Ti). And li;new are all set to l. (vii) Group signature si is re-computed for the
entire block.
(S3) In this step, the user conducts an oblivious sorting for all the blocks in the shuffling buffer, based
on the tags carried by the blocks. As a result, the blocks are placed in the shuffling buffer accord-
ing to the ascending order of their tags, and for blocks of the same tag, the real data blocks are
placed before dummy blocks.
(S4) Again, the user scans the blocks in the shuffling buffer, one by one. This time, the tags of some
dummy blocks are adjusted to ensure that, for each j = 1;    ; 2l, exactly log n (real or dummy)
data blocks are assigned with tag j, while other dummy blocks are assigned with tag 0. Based on
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the sorting result of (S3), the tag adjustment can be conducted as follows by using a temporary
counter: For each j = 1;    ; 2l, when the first block with tag j is scanned, the counter is
initialized to 1. Later on, when a block of the same tag is scanned, the tag of the block remains
unchanged and the counter is incremented by 1, if the counter is smaller than log n; otherwise
(i.e., the counter is equal to log n), the block should be re-tagged with 0.
(S5) In this step, the user conducts another oblivious sorting for all the blocks in the shuffling buffer,
based on the tags carried by the blocks. As a result, the blocks are placed in the shuffling buffer
according to the ascending order of their tags; for blocks of the same tag, however, the data blocks
are placed randomly.
(S6) In this step, a third scan is performed to specify the new location of each block in the shuffling
buffer. Specifically, according to the order produced by (S5), the blocks are placed into the
buckets from layer 1 to layer l and from bucket 1 to bucket 2j for each layer j. Also, for each
block i, the li;new and bi;new fields save its assigned layer number and bucket number; e0 contains
an encrypted version of its Si;ti (without a random nonce) to allow the server to check whether
the block carries a unique e0 value.
Note that, in the last time when all data blocks are uploaded back to buckets, the server needs to check
whether the uploaded set is the same as the downloaded set.
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of the proposed scheme. We firstly explain that
the proposed scheme ensures the same access pattern privacy offered by the underlying ORAM. Then,
we show that any misconduct committed by malicious users can be detected and the attacker can be
identified.
5.4.1 Access Pattern Privacy
Theorem 6. The proposed scheme provides the same level of access pattern privacy as the underlying
ORAM.
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Proof Sketch: We provide an informal sketch of the proof. Firstly, the proposed format of the data
block, which consists of d0i;t, ci;t, ei;t 1, e
0
i;t 1, li;t, bi;t, and si;t, does not leak additional information to
the server. In other words, the data re-encryption semantics remain intact. Secondly, the modified query
and shuffling processes do not break the randomness and obliviousness of the underlying ORAM. For
example, in the modified query process, the target data block is swapped with one of the dummy blocks
at the top layer; this is indeed equivalent to the query process of the original ORAM, which uploads
the target data block to the top layer while the data block at its original location essentially becomes a
dummy.

5.4.2 User Accountability
We now show that any misconduct by a malicious user can be detected either by the server or by
the user who next accesses the data block.
5.4.2.1 Modification Attacks
Modification attacks are referred to as the attacks where a malicious user modifies the actual content
of a data block without proper authorization. This can be detected thanks to the presence of group
signature g, which can be signed only by the users who are authorized to write the data block. The
identity of the user who last accessed the data block can be identified by opening the group signature s.
5.4.2.2 Replacement Attacks
Instead of modifying the data content, a malicious user may launch replacement attacks by replac-
ing some or all fields of a data block Di;ti with those of another block Dj;tj or an older version of the
same block Di;t0i (t
0
i < ti), and then generating a valid group signature s. Our scheme deals with this
type of attacks via Merkle hash tree and consistency checking between fields.
Recall that each data block consists of the following fields: d0, c, e, e0, l, b, and s. Among these
fields, the server keeps a copy of the root hash e and checks whether e in the upload block is the same as
the saved value. Hence, e is well-protected and cannot be replaced. Also, note that d0 and c contain the
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same random nonce of ri;v; hence, if one is replaced while the other is not, this can be easily detected
by checking the consistency between them. Moreover, attacks against the position information l and
b are referred to as misplacement attacks and will be discussed later. Therefore, in this section, we
analyze the following replacement attacks: replacement of d0 and c; or replacement of d0, c, and e0.
Replacement of d0 and c: This can be detected by the user who next accesses the block during
the root hash verification step (V4). As described in (V4), to verify the root hash ei;ti 1 carried in
Di;ti , which was calculated by the server when the block was last accessed, the following information
are needed: ci;ti 1 – the ID hash, and Si;ti 1 – the co-path hashes. ci;ti 1 can be derived as ci;ti 1 =
H(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi), where vi is the version number of the data content when the block was last accessed,
and both i and ri;vi are embedded in d
0
i;ti
. Clearly, replacement of d0i;ti with d
0
j;tj
of another block would
result in an incorrect ID being used to derive ci;ti 1 and hence would fail the verification process. Now,
let’s consider the attacks by replacing d0i;ti with an older version of the same block, i.e., d
0
i;t0i
whose
data content has an earlier version number of v0i < vi. As the nonces embedded in d
0
i;t0i
are ri;v0i and
ri;v0i 1, we have vi > v
0
i > v
0
i   1. This means that the random nonce ri;vi needed to derive ci;ti 1
cannot be found in the replaced d0, which also would result in a verification failure. Here, we assume
that the space for the random nonce is large enough so that the probability of two randomly picked
nonces being the same is negligibly small.
Replacement of d0, c, and e0: As described in the server operation step (S3), the server verifies
that the e0 values are distinct in all the uploaded blocks during the same query/shuffling process. There-
fore, it may only be possible that a malicious user attempts to replace d0i;ti , ci;ti , and e
0
i;ti 1 with those
of another block Dj;t0j from a different query/shuffling process, or an older version of the same block
Di;t0i (t
0
i < ti). In either case, a different Merkle hash tree was constructed. Therefore, similar to the
discussions above, such an attack can be detected by the user who next accesses the block, as it would
result in a root hash verification failure due to the replaced co-path hashes. Here, we assume that the
hash function H is well designed so that for two different Merkle hash trees, the probability that they
have the same root hash is negligibly small.
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5.4.2.3 Misplacement Attacks
A malicious user may place a data block in the wrong bucket and/or layer of the storage hierarchy.
Such attacks can be detected in one of the following ways: (i) the position of the block is inconsistent
with the hash of its ID using the designated hash function; or (ii) the data block cannot be found at the
specified position. In the latter case, the server may work with the dataset owner to scan the storage
hierarchy to locate the misplaced block and identify the attacker through group signature s.
5.4.2.4 Addition/Deletion Attacks
In the proposed scheme, during a query or shuffling process, as the server always checks to en-
sure that the set of downloaded data blocks is the same as the set of uploaded data blocks, any addi-
tion/deletion attacks can be detected by the server.
5.5 Overhead Analysis
In this section, we analyze the storage, communication, and computational overheads incurred by
our scheme, compared to the underlying ORAM scheme.
5.5.1 Storage Overhead
5.5.1.1 Server Overhead
As our scheme requires additional fields in each data block Di;ti , including i;ti , ri;vi , ri;vi 1, i,
gi;vi , ci;ti , ei;ti 1, e0i;ti 1, li;ti , bi;ti and si;ti , extra storage is needed on the server. Table 5.2 gives a
practical example, where there are n  232 real data blocks in the system. We assume that each hash
value is 32-byte long and a group signature takes less than 200 bytes [84]. Thus, each of the i;ti , ri;vi ,
ri;vi 1, ci;ti , and ei;ti 1 fields needs 32 bytes. i stores the ID of the block thus needs logn bits. li;ti
and bi;ti store the layer and bucket indices. Since there are log n layers in the storage hierarchy and at
most n buckets at each layer, li;ti is of log log n bits and bi;ti is of logn bits. e
0
i;ti 1 introduces a larger
overhead, because it stores the information that corresponds to a path from root to leaf in the Merkle
hash tree. In the worst case, the Merkle hash tree may contain n logn data blocks (i.e., when the entire
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database is shuffled) and thus e0i;ti 1 may store up to log(n log n) hash values. Fortunately, this is still
considered a small amount of storage overhead in practice. For example, assuming n  232 and each
hash value is of 32 bytes, the size of e0i;ti 1 is 32 log(n log n) bytes, which is less than 1:1 KB. In this
example, the overall extra storage overhead incurred by our scheme is less than 2 KB per data block;
considering that a data block is typically 64 KB or 256 KB in practice [48], this overhead is acceptable.
Table 5.2: Storage overhead per data block when there are n  232 real data blocks in the system.
i;ti=ri;vi=ri;vi 1 i ci;ti ei;ti 1 e
0
i;ti 1 li;ti bi;ti gi;vi=si;ti
32 bytes 4 bytes 32 bytes 32 bytes  1:1 KB  1 byte 4 bytes < 200 bytes
5.5.1.2 User Overhead
A user also needs an extra storage space to store the group private keys for the blocks that it is
authorized to write and all the group public keys for verifying each block. As a result, in the worst
case, a user needs O(n) storage overhead. However, if two different blocks Di;t and Di;j share the
same access control policy (i.e., Ui;R = Uj;R and Ui;W = Uj;W , as explained in Section 5.3.2), they use
the same public key and the same set of private keys. In practice, a shared file system typically may
have a limited number of access policies (e.g., no more than a few hundred). Thus, the overhead for
storing the keys is acceptable in practice (e.g., no more than a few megabytes). Note that, as explained
in Section 5.3.3, the Merkle hash tree is constructed by the server and the user only needs to verify the
Merkle hash tree information it retrieves; hence, no storage overhead is introduced for this process.
5.5.2 Communication Overhead
5.5.2.1 Downloading
In our scheme, the downloading communication overhead (in units of data blocks) is exactly the
same as the original ORAM scheme. The only difference is that our scheme introduces additional fields
to each data block, as discussed above.
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5.5.2.2 Uploading
For a query process, our proposed scheme has a larger uploading communication overhead than the
original ORAM scheme, because the user needs to upload all retrieved O(log2 n) data blocks back to
the server. For a shuffling process, however, our proposed scheme does not introduce extra uploading
overhead compared to the original ORAM scheme. Consequently, the amortized communication over-
head (which is O(log3 n) or O(log4 n), depending on the choice of the sorting algorithm) is the same
for the two schemes.
5.5.3 Computational Overhead
5.5.3.1 Server Overhead
During a query or shuffling process, the server needs to perform the following extra computations:
(i) construction of a Merkle hash tree, which needs O(n log n) hash computations in the worst case;
(ii) verification of a group signature for each data block, which can be O(n log n) in the worst case.
Note that, both of the above calculations can be parallelized on the server. Hence, the computational
overhead introduced by the proposed scheme should not be an obstacle for the massively parallelized
cloud computing platforms.
5.5.3.2 User Overhead
For each data block Di;ti retrieved in a query or shuffling process, a user needs to perform the
following extra computations: (i) verification of the group signatures gi;vi in the retrieved data block
(and generation of gi;vi+1 for the updated data block for a write operation); (ii) verification of ci;ti in
the retrieved data block and generation of ci;ti+1 for the updated data block, both of which are hash
computations; (iii) decryption of e0i;ti 1 and re-encryption of e
0
i;ti
; (iv) verification of the root hash
ei;ti 1 of the Merkle hash tree, which is composed of a sequence of hash computations; (v) verification
of placement of Di;ti , which is one hash computation; (vi) verification of group signature si;ti and
generation of si;ti+1; and (vii) verification of ei;ti and Si;ti received from the server, which is composed
of a sequence of hash computations. Using a modern pairing-based cryptography library such as PBC
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library [85], each of the above computations can be done efficiently from several milliseconds to several
hundreds of milliseconds.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose an accountability solution for hash-based ORAM schemes such as [27].
It can detect misconduct committed by malicious users and identify the attacker, while not interfering
with the access pattern preservation mechanisms inherent from the underlying ORAM. The goal is
achieved through an integration ofMerkle hash tree and group signature techniques, as well as a delicate
design of the data block format. Results of security analysis and overhead evaluation show that the
proposed scheme has achieved the goals of providing accountability support to ORAM and preservation
of data access pattern privacy. As a tradeoff, the storage, communication, and computational overheads
are increased slightly. Note that, our scheme can also be extended to work with other hash-based
hierarchical ORAM schemes [14, 33–36], as long as the extended data format does not give the server
non-negligible advantages in inferring users’ access pattern in the integrated schemes.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORKS
6.1 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we study the protection of user’s access pattern privacy in un-trusted storage.
We summarize the main contributions of our research as follows.
6.1.1 Light-weight Protection to Access Pattern Privacy
Existing ORAM or PIR schemes offer strict protection to access pattern privacy but incur very high
overhead, which may prevent their usage in practice. Although strict protection of data access pattern
privacy is attractive, less strict protection, such as protecting the privacy of long-term access pattern,
is also very useful in practice. Based on these considerations, we propose two light-weight schemes
to preserve the privacy of long-term data access pattern. The basic scheme is light-weight in practice
for users with reasonable number of data items. The improved scheme significantly improves the
scalability of the solution, as well as reduces the asymptotic overhead. Rigorous proofs and extensive
evaluations have been conducted to demonstrate that the proposed scheme can hide the data access
pattern in the long run, and the number of accesses required to preserve the access pattern privacy is
reasonable in many situations.
6.1.2 Light-weight Protection to Key-word Based Query Privacy
Key-word based query is a primitive function in the scenario of outsourced data storage. In practice,
based on the observations on how the user data have been accessed in the past, such as all prior queries
and replies, all prior appearances of the data storage system, and so on, the storage server could launch
various attacks against query privacy. In this dissertation, we focus on three types of attacks: attacks
based on appearances of queries, attacks based on replies to queries, and attacks based on replies to
103
replayed queries and/or reused database. We show that existing privacy-preserving query schemes
either cannot completely address all three attacks, or they incur very high overhead.
In this dissertation, we propose a novel defense solution, called PQP (Protection of Query Privacy),
which deals with all three attacks at the same time in a light-weight manner. The key innovation
of the proposed PQP scheme lies in its unique query trapdoor design. With PQP, the user builds a
secure searchable keyword index and the query of documents that contain a target keyword becomes
a two-step process: first search over the keyword index, then search over the document collection.
This way, PQP essentially converts keyword query to a series of location requests. Moreover, PQP
adopts a hierarchical structure to store the encrypted documents at the server, which helps reduce the
computational, communication and storage overhead of the query process, thus making PQP a light-
weight solution. Security analysis shows that PQP can deal with all three attacks effectively. We also
provide detailed overhead analysis to justify the lightweight-ness of the proposed scheme.
6.1.3 User Accountability in ORAM
Existing ORAM designs all assume that the outsourced data is accessible to trusted users only and
hence they are not equipped with any protection against attacks towards data integrity from malicious
users. Unfortunately, such an assumption may not hold in practice. Therefore, it is highly desirable to
introduce accountability support into ORAM.
In this dissertation we propose an accountability solution for hash-basd ORAMs. Our scheme can
detect misconduct by malicious users and identify the attackers, while not interfering with the access
pattern preservation mechanisms inherent from the underlying ORAM. This goal is achieved via a
creative integration of Merkle hash tree and group signature techniques, as well as a delicate design
of the data block format. With our scheme, selected traces of accesses are properly recorded for the
purpose of attack detection but without revealing the private information of innocent users that shall be
kept confidential to protect their access pattern privacy. We have conducted both security analysis and
overhead evaluation for the proposed scheme. Results show that our scheme has achieved the design
goals of providing accountability support to ORAM and preservation of data access pattern privacy, at
the cost of slightly increased storage, communication, and computational overheads.
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6.2 Future Works
This section describes the issues related to our conducted research, which require further investiga-
tion.
6.2.1 Access Pattern Privacy on File Level
All current ORAM constructions assume user data are split into equal-sized data blocks. But in
practice, a user accesses its outsourced data in term of files (instead of blocks). If the size of files
are different, even with the protection of ORAM, the leakage of information is obvious. For example,
suppose a user has two files. File A is an email with picture attachment, which has size around 100 KB.
File B is a plain email, which may be less than 1 KB. In current ORAM systems, file A may be divided
into two blocks and file B may be padded to one block. Therefore, accessing file A always incurs two
rounds of access while accessing file B only incurs one round. As a result, the access pattern of file
A will be different from the access pattern of file B. Note that for some applications, such as Google
map, it is safe to assume that file size is the same as block size. However, for most applications, this
assumption may not hold. If ORAM cannot protect access pattern on file level, the practical value of
ORAM may be limited. Therefore it is valuable to study how to protect access pattern privacy on file
level.
6.2.2 ORAM with Access Control
When a dataset is shared among a group of people, it is natural and important to employ access
control mechanism. But due to the conflicting goals of ORAM and access control, it is very challenging
to integrate access control mechanisms with ORAM systems. For example, as part of the functionality
of access control, the server shall be able to prevent a user from changing a data block that it is not
authorized to change. However, with the existing ORAM, it is very difficult to (i) tell whether the data
block has been changed due to the re-encryption of the data items, and (ii) decide whether the user is
authorized to write to a data block. The first question is solved in the ORAM construction proposed
in [61] but with very high overhead. The second question may be solved by some technique similar to
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the one proposed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. However, how to solve these two problems together
is challenging and worthy to be studied.
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